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INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner injured his arm at work in 1983, and has required approximately thirty 
related surgeries since then totaling over $200,000.00, all of which were paid by 
Respondents. In 1987, Petitioner was assigned a rating of 14% whole person impairment, 
but was recently rated at 44% whole person impairment, secondary to his worsening 
industrial injuries. Acting pro se, Petitioner filed an application for hearing, and asked for 
an increased impairment rating, and to increase his compensation rate. 
At the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) asked Petitioner about his 
increased impairment rating claim, but did not ask about Petitioner's claim for increased 
compensation rate claim. The ALJ granted Petitioner's increased compensation rate 
claim and Respondents appealed. Petitioner filed an affidavit that showed his entitlement 
to a higher compensation rate, with corresponding paystubs - the same evidence that 
Petitioner would have produced at the hearing had he been prompted by the Judge. The 
Commission reversed the ALJ's award of increased compensation rate. It concluded that 
Petitioner had waived his claim, and that the ALJ had addressed Petitioner's claim sua 
sponte. The Commission also refused to consider Petitioner's affidavit and paystubs. 
This case is about fundamental fairness for pro se litigants before the Labor 
Commission, and turns on two related issues. First, whether Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
8(1) required the ALJ to ask Petitioner if he had any evidence on issues that were joined 
in the pleadings, and if not, whether the Petitioner's failure to interject unsolicited 
ii 
evidence into the hearing amounted to a waiver of his claim. Second, where the 
Petitioner supplied sworn testimony and exhibits that show his entitlement to benefits to 
the Commission, whether the Commission abused its discretion when it refused to 
consider that evidence as the ultimate finder of fact. 
This Court should reverse the Commission, and grant Petitioner's increased 
compensation rate, awarding him previously underpaid monies and interest. It should 
hold that Petitioner raised his claim in the pleadings, and therefore, the ALJ did not 
address that claim sua sponte. This Court should also hold that Petitioner did not waive 
that claim at the hearing, especially where the ALJ never asked about the claim. 
Finally, this Court should also hold that the Commission abused its discretion 
when it refused to accept Petitioner's undisputed evidence in support of his increased rate 
claim. As the ultimate finder of fact, the Commission cannot disregard undisputed 
material facts. This Court should reverse the Commission, grant Petitioner's increased 
compensation rate, and award him previously underpaid monies and interest. 
iii 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES WITH STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1 
Statement of the Issue 
Whether the statute required the Administrative Law Judge to ask Petitioner if he 
had evidence to present on his claim for increased compensation, and if not, whether 
Petitioner's failure to interject unsolicited evidence at the hearing amounted to a waiver 
of his claim. 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review, With Supporting Authority 
This Court should review the Commission's conclusion that Petitioner waived his 
claim and that the Administrative Law Judge improperly raised issues sua sponte because 
they were questions of law, which this Court reviews for correctness. Savage Indus, v. 
State Tax Comm 'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991). "When reviewing pure questions of 
law, we accord no particular deference to the agency decision . . . but review such 
conclusions for correctness." Hilton Hotel v. Indus. Comm 'n, 897 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 
App. 1995) (internal citations and quotations omitted). This Court should review for 
correctness, and give no deference to the Commission's legal conclusions. 
vii 
Citation to the Record Preserving The Issue For Appeal 
Petitioner preserved the issue on appeal in his Memorandum in Opposition to 
Respondents' Motion for Review R 101- 103. Alternatively, the issue need not have been 
preserved because it arose from the Commission's errant Orders that denied Petitioner's 
claim. 
Issue 2 
Statement of the Issue 
Whether the Commission abused its discretion as the ultimate finder of fact when 
it refused to consider additional undisputed evidence supporting the Judge's award of 
increased compensation rate in Petitioner's response to Respondent's Motion for Review. 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review, With Supporting Authority 
This Court should review the Commission's refusal to consider additional 
evidence for abuse of discretion. The statute gave the Commission explicit discretion to 
accept additional evidence in deciding Respondent's motion for review. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-l-403(c)(ii). Therefore, this Court should review for abuse of discretion under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h); Drake v. Indus. Comm % 939 177, 181-82 (Utah 
1997). 
vni 
Citation to the Record Preserving The Issue For Appeal 
Petitioner preserved the issue on appeal in his Memorandum in Opposition to 
Respondents' Motion for Review R 120 - 125, and his Request for Reconsideration, R 
230-231. 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-307 is set forth verbatim in the Appendix. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801 is set forth verbatim in the Appendix. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8 is set forth verbatim in the Appendix. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 is set forth verbatim in the Appendix. 
Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1 is set forth verbatim in the Appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a denial of workers compensation benefits by the Labor 
Commission. Acting pro se, Petitioner filed an Application for Hearing alleging 
entitlement to inter alia increased compensation rate and interest because his earnings at 
the time of the accident justified the increase. R 1. Respondents filed an Answer that 
joined the issue of increased compensation rate. R 12-15. 
The ALJ held that Petitioner was entitled to an increased rate, and raised his 
weekly compensation rate from $55.00 to $202.00, and ordered Respondents to pay past 
due benefits with interest. R 24 - 28. Respondents filed a Motion for Review. R 29 - 86. 
Petitioner filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Respondents' Motion for Review. R 95 
ix 
-198. Along with his Memorandum, Petitioner attached his sworn affidavit with exhibits 
that showed higher wages at the time of his accident that entitled him to the increased 
compensation rate. He also attached a copy of the hearing transcript. Id. Respondents 
filed a Reply but did not challenge Petitioner's affidavit. R200 - 209. 
The Commission issued its Order Granting Motion for Review, which reversed the 
ALJ's Order, and held that Petitioner did not raise his claim for increased compensation 
rate. R 222 - 227. Petitioner filed a Request for Reconsideration. R 228 - 251. 
Respondents filed a Response to Request for Consideration. R 254 - 259. The 
Commission issued its Order Denying Request for Resconsideration, and held that 
Petitioner "affirmatively limited" his claims, and "waived" his claim for increased 
compensation rate at the hearing, but did not cite to the hearing transcript. R 264 - 266. 
This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This Court should reverse the Commission and find that Petitioner's wages at the 
time of the accident entitled him to a weekly compensation rate of $202.00, and order 
Respondents to pay Petitioner previously underpaid benefits with interest. The ALJ 
appropriately addressed Petitioner's entitlement to the increased compensation rate 
because the issue was joined by the parties' pleadings. The record shows that ALJ did not 
act sua sponte because Petitioner's application for hearing raised the issue as a matter of 
law. 
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This Court should also hold that Petitioner did not "affirmatively limit" or "waive" 
his increased compensation claim. The transcript showed that Petitioner never limited or 
waived that claim because the ALJ never asked him about it. This Court should hold as a 
matter of law that Petitioner's failure to interject unsolicited evidence did not amount to a 
waiver of his increased compensation claim. Further, if the ALJ erred because should 
have asked Petitioner about the claims identified in his Application for Hearing, dismissal 
of Petitioner's claims was a totally inappropriate remedy. This Court should reverse the 
Commission, find that Petitioner's wages entitled him to weekly compensation rate of 
$202.00, and order Respondents to pay previously underpaid benefits with interest. 
Finally, this Court should hold that the Commission abused its discretion when it 
refused to consider relevant undisputed evidence. The facts show that Petitioner provided 
sworn testimony and exhibits that established his entitlement to a higher compensation 
rate. Respondents failed to challenge any part of the evidence. As the ultimate finder of 
fact, the Commission must consider relevant undisputed evidence, and has no discretion 
to ignore such evidence. This Court should reverse the Commission, find that Petitioner's 
wages entitled him to weekly compensation rate of $202.00, and order Respondents to 
pay previously underpaid benefits with interest. 
xi 
FACTS 
1. On July 22, 1983, Petitioner/Appellant Richard D. Grint ("Petitioner") was 
injured in the course and scope of his employment with his employer, Trimco Molding. 
Petitioner's accident occurred when he fell out of the back of a truck and injured his right 
arm. R24. 
2. Respondents/Appellees Trimco Molding and its insurer ("Respondents") 
accepted liability for the industrial accident. After Petitioner's initial right arm surgery, 
he has had numerous complications. Over the years, Respondents have carefully 
monitored and paid for Petitioner's medical treatment expenses, amounting to at least 
$237,160.04 in medical treatment expenses, covering approximately thirty surgeries. R 
13. 
3. On June 5, 1984, Petitioner wrote to inform Trimco's insurer that his wages 
were higher than its records reflected. R 122. Petitioner received no response to his 
letter. 
4. On May 18, 1987, Petitioner was assigned an impairment rating of 24 % 
upper extremity impairment (14% whole person impairment) by Dr. Mark Greene. R 21. 
5. On March 1, 2004, Petitioner filed an application for hearing pro se. 
Among other things, Petitioner alleged that he made $14.00 per hour and was scheduled 
to work 20 hours during the week of the accident. R 1. 
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6. Respondents answered Petitioner's application for hearing. Respondent 
denied that Petitioner's assertions about his wages at the time of the accident: "Please 
note that Petitioner's average weekly wage was only $60.00; thus, his workers' 
compensation rate was $45.00 plus $10.00 for dependents for a total of $55.00 per week." 
Respondents also claimed they paid Petitioner a total of $14,907.85 in weekly benefits at 
the rate of $55.00 per week, for a total of approximately 271 weeks. Answer at 2, R 13. 
7. On February 16, 2005, Petitioner appeared at the scheduled hearing, acting 
pro se. 
8. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted the hearing. During the 
course of the hearing, the ALJ did not ask Petitioner about his increased compensation 
rate claim, or the higher wages identified in his application for hearing, and denied by 
Respondents. See generally, Hearing Transcript, R 127-190. 
9. On March 23, 2005, the ALJ issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order (the ALJ's Order). Among other things, the ALJ's Order increased 
Petitioner's compensation rate to reflect the wages plead in his applications for hearing, 
increasing the weekly rate from $55.00 to $202.00. R 24-28. 
10. Respondents filed a Motion for Review, and Petitioner retained legal 
counsel. 
11. Petitioner filed a Memorandum In Opposition to Respondent's Motion for 
Review. R 95. Petitioner attached a sworn affidavit with exhibits, including paystubs 
xin 
that showed his wages at the time of the industrial accident. R 120-125. Petitioner also 
attached a transcript of the 2/16/05 hearing. R 127 -190. 
12. Respondents filed a Reply, but did not challenge any part of Petitioner's 
affidavit, or supporting documents, or that the facts entitled Petitioner to a higher 
compensation rate. R 260-63. 
13. The Labor Commission granted Respondent's Motion, reversing all but one 
paragraph of the ALJ's Order. Order Granting Motion for Review at 4, R 225. The 
Order stated: 
The Commission has carefully reviewed the entire record in 
this matter and notes that only two issues were submitted to 
Judge Sessions for decision: Mr. Grint's right to medical 
benefits and his right to additional permanent partial disability 
compensation for an increased impairment rating. Judge 
Sessions did not inform the parties that he intended to 
adjudicate any other issues. Consequently, the evidence and 
argument presented during the hearing focused entirely on the 
two issues raised by Mr. Grint. But the decision issued by 
Judge Sessions went beyond those two issues to increase the 
rate of disability compensation, both retroactively and 
prospectively, and to award additional temporary total 
disability compensation. In light of the decisions of the Utah 
Court of Appeals and Utah Supreme Court cited above, the 
Commission concludes it was error for Judge Sessions to raise 
and decide these additional issues.. . . The Commission will 
therefore set aside Judge Sessions' decision on those issues. 
Order Granting Motion for Review at 2 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted), R 223. 
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14. The footnote to this paragraph stated: 
The record in this matter illustrates the necessity of 
limiting decisions to those issues actually raised during the 
hearing process. Because no one identified compensation rate 
or duration of temporary total disability as disputed issues, no 
evidence or argument was presented on those issues. 
Consequently, when Judge Sessions addressed those issues 
sua sponte, he relied on incomplete evidence and reached 
conclusions that may be significantly inaccurate. 
Order Granting Motion for Review at 2 (footnote text), R 223. 
15. The Order failed to identify any part of the hearing transcript that supported 
its conclusion. Id. 
16. Petitioner filed a Request for Reconsideration on the issue of higher 
wages/increased compensation rate. R 228-251. 
17. The Commission denied Petitioner's Request. It reasoned that: 
The essential fact missing from Mr. Grint's argument 
is that, at the beginning of the evidentiary hearing on his 
claim, Mr. Grint affirmatively stated to Judge Sessions and 
Trimco that the claim was limited to permanent partial 
disability compensation for an increased impairment rating. 
Consequently, neither party submitted evidence or argument 
on any other issues, nor did Judge Sessions inquire into any 
other issues. 
In light of the limits Mr. Grint placed on his claim, 
Trimco was not required to produce evidence on any other 
issues. Judge Sessions erred, not by failing to pursue other 
issues during the evidentiary hearing, but in later deciding 
additional issues that Mr. Grint had excluded from 
consideration. And because such additional issues were 
waived by Mr. Grint, the Commission will not consider post-
hearing evidence on those issues. 
xv 
Order Denying Request for Reconsideration at 1-2, R 264-5. 
18. The Order failed to identify any part of the hearing transcript where 
Petitioner "affirmatively stated" that his claim was "limited" to permanent partial 
disability benefits, or where he "excluded" or "waived" his claim to a higher 
compensation rate. Id. 
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ARGUMENT 
L This Court Should Hold That Petitioner Raised The Issue Of Increased 
Compensation Rate When He Plead Higher Wages In His Application for 
Hearing, And That He Did Not Waive The Issue At The Hearing. 
A^ Petitioner Raised His Claim For Increased Compensation Rate In His 
Application For Hearing. 
Petitioner raised his claim for increased compensation rate when he alleged higher 
wages in his application for hearing. Issues are "raised" when the parties have identified 
facts in their pleadings that entitle them to relief. Utah R Civ P 8(a). "Pleadings" include 
a complaint and answer, Utah R Civ. P 7(a): In workers' compensation cases, the 
pleadings include applications for hearing and answers. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801; 
UAR 602-2-1(B)(1), (C)(l)-(2), and (N). Put another way, parties raise issues when they 
plead facts in an application for hearing that entitle them to relief. In this case, Petitioner 
plead higher wages in his application for hearing. Facts f^ 5. Moreover, Respondents 
specifically joined issue on Petitioner's increased compensation rate in their Answer. 
Facts f 6. This Court should find that Petitioner raised his claim for increased 
compensation rate because he alleged higher wages in his application for hearing. 
The ALJ did not address Petitioner's increased compensation rate sua sponte. The 
Commission errantly concluded that the ALJ had addressed Petitioner's claim for 
increased compensation rate sua sponte. Facts \ 14. The Commission relied on the case 
of Hilton Hotel v. Indus. Comm % 897 P.2d 352 (Utah App. 1995), but that case supports 
Petitioner's position. 
In Hilton Hotel, the Petitioner filed an application for hearing, and alleged an 
industrial injury on April 19, 1992, when she lifted a heavy tub of dishes. Id. at 353. 
After the hearing, the ALJ determined that the Petitioner had been injured by accident 
under a cumulative trauma theory - relying not only on the single incident, but on the 
cumulative effect of multiple exertions. But Petitioner did not plead that theory in her 
application for hearing, nor had she raised the theory during the hearing. Id. at 355. This 
Court reasoned that "Because cumulative trauma was not an expressed or implied theory 
presented by Jacobsen, she waived the right to advance that claim. Therefore, the 
Commission's decision regarding this issue was outside the issues presented for 
adjudication and is a nullity." Id. at 356. This Court concluded that "Hilton was never 
apprised by Jacobsen that a basis of her claim was cumulative trauma. As a result, Hilton 
was denied the opportunity to present evidence and challenge this type of claim." Id. But 
where the Petitioner raises the issue in the pleadings, Hilton Hotel does not apply. 
The Hilton Hotel case does not apply to this case because the issue was raised and 
joined in the pleadings. Unlike Hilton Hotel, Petitioner raised the issue in his Application 
for Hearing, Facts j^ 5, and Respondents' joined the issue in its Answer. Facts f^ 6. The 
ALJ increased Petitioner's compensation rate. Facts \ 9. The record shows that the 
parties and the ALJ were aware of the issue; neither of the Commission's Orders 
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acknowledged that the parties joined this issue. Where the issue was raised and joined by 
the parties pleadings, the ALJ simply addressed the disputed claim and did not act sua 
sponte. Cf9 Order at 2 n. 2. The Commission's errant (<sua sponte " conclusion can not 
be reconciled with the record. The Hilton Hotel case supports Petitioner's position, and 
undermines the Commission's Order. 
This Court should hold that Petitioner raised the issue of increased compensation 
rate as a matter of law when he plead higher wages in his application for hearing. The 
Commission's legal conclusion that Petitioner did not raise the issue is not entitled to 
deference and is reviewed for correctness. Savage Indus, v. State Tax Comm yn, 811 P.2d 
664, 670 (Utah 1991); Hilton Hotel, 897 P.2d at 354. This Court should reverse the 
Commission and reinstate the ALJ's finding that Petitioner was entitled to an increased 
compensation rate, and order previously underpaid compensation to be paid at the 
increased compensation rate, with interest. 
Having shown that Petitioner raised the issue of increased compensation rate, the 
facts also show that he did not waive that issue at the hearing. 
B. Petitioner Did Not Waive His Claim At The Hearing. 
This Court should find that Petitioner did not waive his claim for increased 
compensation rate at the hearing. The Commission's Orders failed to cite to any part of 
the hearing transcript to support its conclusions. The first Order baldly asserted that 
Petitioner only raised two issues: additional permanent partial impairment and medical 
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treatment expenses. Facts TJ 13. The second Order said that Petitioner "affirmatively 
limited" his claims, and "waived" his claim to increased compensation rate. Facts ^ 17. 
But the Order failed to cite to the transcript where Petitioner allegedly limited or waived 
his claims.1 Facts ^ 18. That is because Petitioner did not "affirmatively limit" his claims 
or "waive" others. Instead, the transcript showed that the ALJ never asked Petitioner 
about his increased compensation rate, even though he raised the issue in his pleadings. 
The facts simply do not support the Commission's conclusion that Petitioner 
"affirmatively limited" his claims, or "waived" his claim to increased compensation.2 
Petitioner did not waive his increased compensation claim because the ALJ never 
questioned him about it. Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(l)(a), the ALJ "shall 
regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford 
all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions." See also, Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-1-307. Petitioner did not conduct the hearing, and as a pro se litigant, should 
not be expected to do more than answer questions and present evidence when prompted 
1
 Petitioner had already supplied the Commission with a copy of the hearing 
transcript at his expense when he filed his Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Review. If the transcript had supported the Commission's conclusions, the Commission 
would have cited to the applicable portion(s). 
2
 Nor should Petitioner have to make out the Commission's case to attack it 
on appeal. Where Petitioner supplied the Commission with a hearing transcript at his 
own expense, and the Commission did not even cite to where Petitioner allegedly 
"limited" or "waived" his claims, the Order is deficient as a matter of law. Adams v. Bd. 
Of Review of Indus. Comm % 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1991). The Order's failure to 
adequately explain its conclusions with supporting facts provides an independent basis for 
reversal. 
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by the Judge. The ALJ should have asked the parties to present evidence on the issue of 
increased compensation rate, but did not. Apparently, when Respondents showed up with 
no witnesses, the ALJ deduced that they could not dispute Petitioner's wage allegations. 
Accordingly, the Judge relied on the pleadings to find that Petitioner was entitled to a 
higher compensation rate.3 These facts do not support the Commission's conclusion that 
Petitioner waived his claim to a higher compensation rate. This Court should find that 
Petitioner raised the issue in his pleadings, and did not waive the claim at the hearing. 
Alternatively, Petitioner should be punished for judicial error. The Commission's 
first Order found Judge Sessions blameworthy when it charged that he "relied on 
incomplete evidence," and "reached conclusions that may be significantly inaccurate" 
when he addressed Petitioner's increased wage claim "sua sponte" Facts f^ 14. Even if it 
were possible to address a claim sua sponte that was first raised in the pleadings, the 
appropriate remedy was not to dismiss Petitioner's claims. The Commission should have 
remanded the case with instructions if it believed the judge erred. But the Commission 
did not remand: It denounced the Judge and dismissed Petitioner's claims. 
The Commission's Order wrongly tried to lower the bar for ALJs, and set a trap 
for unwary Petitioners. Under the Commission's Order, ALJs need not question parties 
about issues raised in the pleadings. When that happens, Petitioners who fail to interject 
3
 Even if it was error for the ALJ to rely on the pleadings, it was rendered 
harmless by Petitioner's subsequent undisputed affidavit and exhibits. Facts ffij 11 and 
12. 
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their claims will be found to have "waived" those claims. But the statute commands 
otherwise. Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(l)(a), the ALJ "shall. . . obtain full 
disclosure of relevant facts" at hearings. Accordingly, Petitioners have no duty to 
interject unsolicited evidence of their claims upon pain of waiver. This Court should 
reverse the Commission, and reinstate the ALJ's finding that Petitioner was entitled to an 
increased compensation rate, and order previously under paid compensation to be paid at 
the increased rate, with interest. 
II, This Court Should Hold That The Commission Abused Its Discretion When It 
Refused To Accept Petitioner's Sworn Affidavit And Paystubs Into Evidence. 
The Commission abused its discretion when it rejected Petitioner's affidavit and 
paystubs that showed his higher earnings at the time of the accident. The Commission is 
the ultimate finder of fact. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12(6)(iii); Accord, Hoskings, v. 
Indus. Comm% 918 P.2d 150 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied, 918 P.2d 150; Comm 
Carriers v. Indus. Comm'n, 888 P.2d 707 (Utah App. 1994); Chase v Indus Comm'n, 
872 475 (Utah App. 1994). Accordingly, it may accept new evidence in a motion for 
review (or response thereto) before it issues a final order. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
12(4); Accord, United States Steel Corp.v. Indus. Comm % 607 P.2d 807, 811 (Utah 
1980). 
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The Commission refused to accept Petitioner's undisputed testimony and 
documents into evidence, even though it was the ultimate finder of fact. Petitioner filed a 
sworn affidavit with exhibits, including paystubs that showed his higher wages at the time 
of the accident, along with his Memorandum in Opposition to Respondents' Motion for 
Review.4 Facts ^ 11. Respondent failed to controvert these facts in its Reply. Facts f^ 12. 
The Commission should have considered Petitioner's affidavit because it was central to 
the issue on appeal, and because Respondents failed to challenge the evidence when it 
had the opportunity. Instead, it held that "because such additional issues were waived by 
[Petitioner], the Commission will not consider post-hearing evidence on those issues." 
Facts Tj 17. The Commission erred when it concluded that Petitioner "waived" his claim, 
and its refusal to accept undisputed relevant evidence was predicated on legal error. 
Putting aside the Commission's legal error, it should have considered Petitioner's 
evidence in its role as the ultimate finder of fact. 
The Commission abused its discretion when it refused to consider Petitioner's 
uncontroverted sworn testimony and exhibits. In the case of Martinez v. Media-
Paymaster Plus, 2005 Utah App. 308, 117 P.3d 1074, this Court held that the 
Commission abused its discretion when it ignored the only evidence on point. In that 
case, the employer's own expert witness admitted there were no jobs Mr. Martinez could 
4
 Had the ALJ questioned Petitioner in the hearing about his higher 
compensation rate, Petitioner would have offered his testimony and the exhibits into 
evidence. Facts \ 11, R 120-125. 
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perform, but the Commission held that work was "reasonably available" to him. Id. at J^ 
16, 1078-79. In other words, where the only evidence showed that there were no jobs Mr. 
Martinez could perform, the Commission abused its discretion when it ignored that 
evidence. As the ultimate finder of fact, the Commission abused its discretion when it 
disregarded undisputed relevant evidence. 
Similarly, the Commission abused its discretion when it refused to consider 
Petitioner's undisputed relevant evidence. Petitioner produced a sworn affidavit and 
exhibits, including paystubs that showed Petitioner's entitlement to an increased 
compensation rate. Respondents filed a Reply, but failed to challenge any part of the 
affidavit, or to deny that the evidence would entitle Petitioner to an increased 
compensation rate. This Court should find that the Commission's exclusion of relevant 
admissible evidence was an abuse of discretion, given its role as the ultimate finder of 
fact. 
This Court should hold that the Commission abused its discretion when it refused 
to consider Petitioner's undisputed sworn testimony and supporting documents that 
showed his entitlement to a higher compensation rate. This Court should reverse the 
Commission, find that Petitioner was entitled to an increased compensation rate of 




This Court should reverse the Commission and find that Petitioner's wages at the 
time of the accident entitled him to a weekly compensation rate of $202.00, and order 
Respondents to pay Petitioner previously underpaid benefits with interest. The ALJ 
appropriately addressed Petitioner's entitlement to the increased compensation rate 
because the issue was joined by the parties' pleadings. The record shows that ALJ did not 
act sua sponte because Petitioner's application for hearing raised the issue as a matter of 
law. 
This Court should also hold that Petitioner did not "affirmatively limit" or "waive" 
his increased compensation claim. The transcript showed that Petitioner never limited or 
waived that claim because the ALJ never asked him about it. This Court should hold as a 
matter of law that Petitioner's failure to interject unsolicited evidence did not amount to a 
waiver of his increased compensation claim. Further, if the ALJ erred because should 
have asked Petitioner about the claims identified in his Application for Hearing, dismissal 
of Petitioner's claims was a totally inappropriate remedy. This Court should reverse the 
Commission, find that Petitioner's wages entitled him to weekly compensation rate of 
$202.00, and order Respondents to pay previously underpaid benefits with interest. 
Finally, this Court should hold that the Commission abused its discretion when it 
refused to consider relevant undisputed evidence. The facts show that Petitioner provided 
sworn testimony and exhibits that established his entitlement to a higher compensation 
9 
rate. Respondents failed to challenge any part of the evidence. As the ultimate finder of 
fact, the Commission must consider relevant undisputed evidence, and has no discretion 
to ignore such evidence. This Court should reverse the Commission, find that Petitioner's 
wages entitled him to weekly compensation rate of $202.00, and order Respondents to 
pay previously underpaid benefits with interest. 
DATED this 18th day of October, 2006. 
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP, P.C. 
Richard R. Burke 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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Utah Code Section 34A-1-307 Page 1 of 1 
34A-1-307. Action permitted in adjudicative proceedings. 
For the purposes mentioned in this title, the commission may take any action permitted: 
(1) if a formal adjudicative proceeding, under Section 63-46b-7 or 63-46b-8; or 
(2) if an informal adjudicative proceeding, under Section 63-46b-5. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 375, 1997 General Session 
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34A-2-801. Initiating adjudicative proceedings — Procedure for review of administrative 
action. 
(1) (a) To contest an action of the employee's employer or its insurance carrier concerning a 
compensable industrial accident or occupational disease alleged by the employee, any of the following 
shall file an application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication: 
(i) the employee; or 
(ii) a representative of the employee, the qualifications of whom are defined in rule by the 
commission. 
(b) To appeal the imposition of a penalty or other administrative act imposed by the division on the 
employer or its insurance carrier for failure to comply with this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, any of the following shall file an application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication: 
(i) the employer; 
(ii) the insurance carrier; or 
(iii) a representative of either the employer or the insurance carrier, the qualifications of whom are 
defined in rule by the commission. 
(c) A person providing goods or services described in Subsections 34A-2-407(12) and 34A-3-108 
(12) may file an application for hearing in accordance with Section 34A-2-407 or 34A-3-108. 
(d) An attorney may file an application for hearing in accordance with Section 34A-1-309. 
(2) Unless a party in interest appeals the decision of an administrative law judge in accordance with 
Subsection (3), the decision of an administrative law judge on an application for hearing filed under 
Subsection (1) is a final order of the commission 30 days after the date the decision is issued. 
(3) (a) A party in interest may appeal the decision of an administrative law judge by filing a motion 
for review with the Division of Adjudication within 30 days of the date the decision is issued. 
(b) Unless a party in interest to the appeal requests under Subsection (3)(c) that the appeal be heard 
by the Appeals Board, the commissioner shall hear the review. 
(c) A party in interest may request that an appeal be heard by the Appeals Board by filing the request 
with the Division of Adjudication: 
(i) as part of the motion for review; or 
(ii) if requested by a party in interest who did not file a motion for review, within 20 days of the date 
the motion for review is filed with the Division of Adjudication. 
(d) A case appealed to the Appeals Board shall be decided by the majority vote of the Appeals Board. 
(4) All records on appeals shall be maintained by the Division of Adjudication. Those records shall 
include an appeal docket showing the receipt and disposition of the appeals on review. 
(5) Upon appeal, the commissioner or Appeals Board shall make its decision in accordance with 
Section 34A-1-303. 
(6) The commissioner or Appeals Board shall promptly notify the parties to any proceedings before it 
of its decision, including its findings and conclusions. 
(7) The decision of the commissioner or Appeals Board is final unless within 30 days 
after the date the decision is issued further appeal is initiated under the provisions of this section or Title 
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(8) (a) Within 30 days after the date the decision of the commissioner or Appeals Board is issued, 
any aggrieved party may secure judicial review by commencing an action in the court of appeals against 
tne commissioner or Appeals Board for the review of the decision of the commissioner or Appeals 
Board. 
(b) In an action filed under Subsection (8)(a): 
(i) any other party to the proceeding before the commissioner or Appeals Board shall be made a 
party; and 
(ii) the commission shall be made a party. 
(c) A party claiming to be aggrieved may seek judicial review only if the party has exhausted the 
]3arty's remedies before the commission as provided by this section. 
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(d) At the request of the court of appeals, the commission shall certify and file with the court all 
documents and papers and a transcript of all testimony taken in the matter together with the decision of 
the commissioner or Appeals Board. 
Amended by Chapter 295, 2006 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 34A02069.ZIP 3,724 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter]Chapters in this Title|All TitlesjLegislative Home Page 
Last revised Tuesday, October 03, 2006 
http://le.utah.gov/~code/TITLE34A/htm/34A02069.htm 10/18/2006 
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63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Hearing procedure. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3 (d)(i) and (ii), in all formal adjudicative proceedings, 
a hearing shall be conducted as follows: 
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of relevant 
facts and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions. 
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding officer: 
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious; 
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah; 
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy or excerpt 
contains all pertinent portions of the original document; 
(iv) may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially noticed under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, of the record of other proceedings before the agency, and of technical or scientific facts within 
the agency's specialized knowledge. 
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is hearsay. 
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to present evidence, argue, 
respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit rebuttal evidence. 
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudicative proceeding the opportunity 
to present oral or written statements at the hearing. 
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be considered in reaching a 
decision on the merits, shall be given under oath. 
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense. 
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the agency prepare a transcript of 
the hearing, subject to any restrictions that the agency is permitted by statute to impose to protect 
confidential information disclosed at the hearing. 
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties. 
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appropriate measures necessary 
to preserve the integrity of the hearing. 
Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session 
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63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure. 
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review 
of an order by the agency or by a superior agency, the aggrieved party may file a written request for 
review within 30 days after the issuance of the order with the person or entity designated for that 
purpose by the statute or rule. 
(b) The request shall: 
(i) be signed by the party seeking review; 
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested; 
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and 
(iv) be mailed to the presiding officer and to each party. 
(2) (a) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for review, or within the time period 
provided by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may file a response with the person designated 
by statute or rule to receive the response. 
(b) The party who files a response under Subsection (2)(a) shall mail a copy of the response to each 
of the parties and to the presiding officer. 
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an order by the agency or a superior agency, the 
agency or superior agency shall review the order within a reasonable time or within the time required by 
statute or the agency's rules. 
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by order or rule permit the parties to file 
briefs or other documents, or to conduct oral argument. 
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all parties. 
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other filings, or oral argument, or 
v/ithin the time required by statute or applicable rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a 
written order on review. 
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or by a person designated by the agency 
for that purpose and shall be mailed to each party. 
(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring review; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed, or modified, 
and whether all or any portion of the adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded; 
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration or judicial review available to 
aggrieved parties; and 
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review. 
Amended by Chapter 138, 2001 General Session 
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R602-2 1 Pleadings and Discovery 
A Definitions 
1 "Commission" means the Labor Commission 
2 "Division" means the Division of Adjudication within the Labor Commission 
3 "Application for Hearing" means the request for agency action iegardmg a workers' compensation claim 
4 "Supporting medical documentation" means a Summary of Medical Record or other medical report oi 
tieatment note completed by a physician that indicates the presence or absence of a medical causal connection 
between benefits sought and the alleged industrial injury 
5 "Authorization to Release Medical Records" is a form authorizing the injured workers' medical providers to 
provide medical iecords and other medical information to the commission or a party 
6 "Supporting documents" means supporting medical documentation, list of medical pio\ iders \uthoiization to 
Release Medical Records and, when applicable, an Appointment of Counsel Foim 
7 "Petitioner" means the peison oi entity who has filed an Application foi Ileanng 
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8. "Respondent" means the person or entity against whom the Application for Hearing was filed. 
9. "Discovery motion" includes a motion to compel or a motion for protective order. 
B. Application for Hearing. 
1. Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is denied by an employer or insurance carrier, the burden rests 
with the injured worker, or medical provider, to initiate agency action by filing an Application for Hearing with the 
Division. Applications for hearing shall include an original, notarized Authorization to Release Medical Records. 
2. An employer, insurance carrier, or any other party with standing under the Workers' Compensation Act may 
obtain a hearing before the Adjudication Division by filing a request for agency action with the Division. 
3. All Applications for Hearing shall include any available supporting medical documentation of the claim where 
there is a dispute over medical issues. Applications for Hearing without supporting documentation and a properly 
completed Authorization to Release Medical Records may not be mailed to the employer or insurance carrier for 
answer until the appropriate documents have been provided. In addition to respondent's answer, a respondent may 
file a motion to dismiss the Application for Hearing where there is no supporting medical documentation filed to 
demonstrate medical causation when such is at issue between the parties. 
4. When an Application for Hearing with appropriate supporting documentation is filed with the Division, the 
Division shall forthwith mail to the respondents a copy of the Application for Hearing, supporting documents and 
Notice of Formal Adjudication and Order for Answer. 
5. In cases where the injured worker is represented by an attorney, a completed and signed Appointment of 
Counsel form shall be filed with the Application for Hearing or upon retention of the attorney. 
C. Answer. 
1. The respondent(s) shall have 30 days from the date of mailing of the Order for Answer, to file a written answer 
to the Application for Hearing. 
2. The answer shall admit or deny liability for the claim and shall state the reasons liability is denied. The answer 
shall state all affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and detail that the petitioner and the Division may be fully 
informed of the nature and substance of the defenses asserted. 
3. All answers shall include a summary of benefits which have been paid to date on the claim, designating such 
payments by category, i.e. medical expenses, temporary total disability, permanent partial disability, etc. 
4. When liability is denied based upon medical issues, copies of all available medical reports sufficient to support 
the denial of liability shall be filed with the answer. 
5. If the answer filed by the respondents fails to sufficiently explain the basis of the denial, fails to include 
available medical reports or records to support the denial, or contains affirmative defenses without sufficient factual 
detail to support the affirmative defense, the Division may strike the answer filed and order the respondent to file 
within 20 days, a new answer which conforms with the requirements of this rule. 
6. All answers must state whether the respondent is willing to mediate the claim. 
7. Petitioners are allowed to timely amend the Application for Hearing, and respondents are allowed to timely 
amend the answer, as newly discovered information becomes available that would warrant the amendment. The 
parties shall not amend their pleadings later than 45 days prior to the scheduled hearing without leave of the 
Administrative Law Judge. 
8. Responses and answers to amended pleadings shall be filed within ten days of service of the amended pleading 
without further order of the Labor Commission. 
D. Default 
1. If a respondent fails to file an answer as provided in Subsection C above, the Division may enter a default 
against the respondent. 
2. If default is entered against a respondent, the Division may conduct any further proceedings necessary to take 
evidence and determine the issues raised by the Application for Hearing without the participation of the party in 
default pursuant to Section 63-46b-11(4), Utah Code. 
3. A default of a respondent shall not be construed to deprive the Employer's Reinsurance Fund or Uninsured 
Employers' Fund of any appropriate defenses. 
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4. The defaulted party may file a motion to set aside the default under the procedures set forth in Section 63-460-
11(3), Utah Code. The Adjudication Division shall set aside defaults upon written and signed stipulation of all parties 
to the action. 
E. Waiver of Hearing. 
1. The parties may, with the approval of the administrative law judge, waive their right to a hearing and enter into 
a stipulated set of facts, which may be submitted to the administrative law judge. The administrative law judge may 
use the stipulated facts, medical records and evidence in the record to make a final determination of liability or refer 
the matter to a Medical Panel for consideration of the medical issues pursuant to R602-2-2. 
2. Stipulated facts shall include sufficient facts to address all the issues raised in the Application for Hearing and 
answer. 
3. In cases where Medical Panel review is required, the administrative law judge may forward the evidence in the 
record, including but not limited to, medical records, fact stipulations, radiographs and deposition transcripts, to a 
medical panel for assistance in resolving the medical issues. 
F. Discovery. 
1. Upon filing the answer, the respondent and the petitioner may commence discovery. Discovery allowed under 
this rule may include interrogatories, requests for production of documents, depositions, and medical examinations. 
Discovery shall not include requests for admissions. Appropriate discovery under this rule shall focus on matters 
relevant to the claims and defenses at issue in the case. All discovery requests are deemed continuing and shall be 
promptly supplemented by the responding party as information comes available. 
2. Without leave of the administrative law judge, or written stipulation, any party may serve upon any other party 
written interrogatories, not exceeding 25 in number, including all discrete subparts, to be answered by the party 
served. The frequency or extent of use of interrogatories, requests for production of documents, medical examinations 
and/or depositions shall be limited by the administrative law judge if it is determined that: 
a. The discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from another source that is 
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; 
b. The party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the discovery 
sought; or 
c. The discoveiy is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in 
controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the adjudication. 
3. Upon reasonable notice, the respondent may require the petitioner to submit to a medical examination by a 
physician of the respondent's choice. 
4. All parties may conduct depositions pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 34A-1-308, 
Utah Code. 
5. Requests for production of documents are allowed, but limited to matters relevant to the claims and defenses at 
issue in the case, and shall not include requests for documents provided with the petitioner's Application for Hearing, 
nor the respondents' answer. 
6. Parties shall diligently pursue discovery so as not to delay the adjudication of the claim. If a hearing has been 
scheduled, discovery motions shall be filed no later than 45 days prior to the hearing unless leave of the administrative 
law judge is obtained. 
7. Discovery motions shall contain copies of all relevant documents pertaining to the discoveiy- at issue, such as 
mailing certificates and follow up requests for discovery. The responding party shall have 10 days from the date the 
discovery motion is mailed to file a response to the discovery motion. 
8. Parties conducting discovery under this rule shall maintain mailing certificates and follow up letters regarding 
discovery to submit in the event Division intervention is necessary to complete discovery. Discovery documents shall 
not be filed with the Division at the time they are forwarded to opposing parties. 
9. Any party who fails to obey an administrative law judge's discovery order shall be subject to the sanctions 
available under Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
G. Subpoenas. 
1. Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all discovery proceedings to compel the attendance of witnesses. 
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All subpoenas shall be signed by the administrative law judge assigned to the case, or the duty judge where the 
assigned judge is not available. Subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses shall be served at least 14 days prior 
to the hearing consistent with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 45. Witness fees and mileage shall be paid by the party 
which subpoenas the witness. 
2. A subpoena to produce records shall be served on the holder of the record at least 14 days prior to the date 
specified in the subpoena as provided in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 45. All fees associated with the production of 
documents shall be paid by the party which subpoenas the record. 
II. Medical Records Exhibit. 
1. The parties are expected to exchange medical records during the discovery period. 
2. Petitioner shall submit all relevant medical records contained in his/her possession to the respondent for the 
preparation of a joint medical records exhibit at least twenty (20) working days prior to the scheduled hearing. 
3. The respondent shall prepare a joint medical record exhibit containing all relevant medical records. The 
medical record exhibit shall include all relevant treatment records that tend to prove or disprove a fact in issue. 
Hospital nurses' notes, duplicate materials, and other non-relevant materials need not be included in the medical 
record exhibit. 
4. The medical records shall be indexed, paginated, arranged by medical care provider in chronological order and 
bound. 
5. The medical record exhibit prepared by the respondent shall be delivered to the Division and the petitioner or 
petitioner's counsel at least ten (10) working days prior to the hearing. Late-filed medical records may or may not be 
admitted at the discretion of the administrative law judge by stipulation or for good cause shown. 
6. The administrative law judge may require the respondent to submit an additional copy of the joint medical 
record exhibit in cases referred to a medical panel. 
7. The petitioner is responsible to obtain radiographs and diagnostic films for review by the medical panel. The 
administrative law judge shall issue subpoenas where necessary to obtain radiology films. 
I. Hearing. 
1. Notices of hearing shall be mailed to the addresses of record of the parties. The parties shall provide current 
addresses to the Division for receipt of notices or risk the entry of default and loss of the opportunity to participate at 
the hearing. 
2. Judgment may be entered without a hearing after default is entered or upon stipulation and waiver of a hearing 
by the parties. 
3. No later than 45 days prior to the scheduled hearing, all parties shall file a signed pretrial disclosure form that 
identifies: (1) fact witnesses the parties actually intend to call at the hearing; (2) expert witnesses the parties actually 
intend to call at the hearing; (3) language translator the parties intend to use at the hearing; (4) exhibits, including 
reports, the parties intend to offer in evidence at the hearing; (5) the specific benefits or relief claimed by the 
petitioner; (6) the specific defenses that the respondent actually intends to litigate; (7) whether, or not, a party-
anticipates that the case will take more than four hours of hearing time; (8) the job categories or titles the respondents 
claim the petitioner is capable of performing if the claim is for permanent total disability, and; (9) any other issues 
that the parties intend to ask the administrative law judge to adjudicate. The administrative law judge may exclude 
witnesses, exhibits, evidence, claims, or defenses as appropriate of any party who fails to timely file a signed pre-trial 
disclosure form as set forth above. The parties shall supplement the pre-trial disclosure form with information that 
newly becomes available after filing the original form. The pre-trial disclosure form does not replace other discovery 
allowed under these rules. 
4. If the petitioner requires the sendees of language translation during the hearing, the petitioner has the 
obligation of providing a person who can translate between the petitioner's native language and English during the 
hearing. If the respondents are dissatisfied with the proposed translator identified by the petitioner, the respondents 
may provide a qualified translator for the hearing at the respondent's expense. 
5. The petitioner shall appear at the hearing prepared to outline the benefits sought, such as the periods for which 
compensation and medical benefits are sought, the amounts of unpaid medical bills, and a permanent partial 
disability rating, if applicable. If mileage reimbursement for travel to receive medical care is sought, the petitioner 
shall bring documentation of mileage, including the dates, the medical provider seen and the total mileage. 
6. The respondent shall appear at the hearing prepared to address the merits of the petitioner's claim and provide 
evidence to support any defenses timely raised. 
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7. Parties are expected to be prepared to present their evidence on the date the hearing is scheduled. Requests for 
continuances maybe granted or denied at the discretion of the administrative law judge for good cause shown. Lack of 
diligence in preparing for the hearing shall not constitute good cause for a continuance. 
8. Subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the Labor Commission, the evidentiary record shall be deemed closed 
at the conclusion of the hearing, and no additional evidence will be accepted without leave of the administrative law 
judge. 
J. Motions-Time to Respond. 
Responses to all motions other than discovery motions shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date the 
motion was filed with the Division. Reply memoranda shall be filed within seven (7) days from the date a response was 
filed with the Division. 
K. Notices. 
1. Orders and notices mailed by the Division to the last address of record provided by a party are deemed served 
on that party. 
2. Where an attorney appears on behalf of a party, notice of an action by the Division served on the attorney is 
considered notice to the party represented by the attorney. 
L. Form of Decisions. 
Decisions of the presiding officer in any adjudicative proceeding shall be issued in accordance with the provisions 
of Section 63-46^5 or 63~46b-io, Utah Code. 
M. Motions for Review. 
1. Any party to an adjudicative proceeding may obtain review of an Order issued by an Administrative Law Judge 
by filing a written request for review with the Adjudication Division in accordance with the provisions of Section 63-
46b-i2 and Section 34A-1-303, Utah Code. Unless a request for review is properly filed, the Administrative Law-
Judge's Order is the final order of the Commission. If a request for review is filed, other parties to the adjudicative 
proceeding may file a response within 20 calendar days of the date the request for review was filed. If such a response 
is filed, the party filing the original request for review may reply within 10 calendar days of the date the response was 
filed. Thereafter the Administrative Law Judge shall: 
a. Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Order after holding such further hearing and receiving such further 
evidence as may be deemed necessary; 
b. Amend or modify the prior Order by a Supplemental Order; or 
c. Refer the entire case for review under Section 34A-2-801, Utah Code. 
2. If the Administrative Law Judge enters a Supplemental Order, as provided in this subsection, it shall be final 
unless a request for review of the same is filed. 
N. Procedural Rules. 
In formal adjudicative proceedings, the Division shall generally follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
regarding discovery and the issuance of subpoenas, except as the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are modified by the 
express provisions of Section 34A-2-802, Utah Code or as may be otherwise modified by these rules. 
O. Requests for Reconsideration and Petitions for Judicial Review. 
A request for reconsideration of an Order on Motion for Review may be allowed and shall be governed by the 
provisions of Section 63-46^13, Utah Code. Any petition for judicial review of final agency action shall be governed by 
the provisions of Section 63-46^14, Utah Code. 
R602-2-2 Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel 
Pursuant to Section 34A-2-601, the Commission adopts the following guidelines in determining the necessity of 
submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge where one or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant medical 
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MICHAEL E. DYER [A3786] 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Attorneys for Trimco Moulding and/or 
Argonaut Insurance Company 
257 East 200 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2048 
Telephone: (801) 521-7900 
- BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH -
Case No. 20040182 
RICHARD D. GRINT, 
Petitioner, 
ANSWER TO 
v. APPLICATION FOR HEARING 
TRIMCO MOULDING and/or 
ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY 
Respondents. 
— h — • — — 
Respondents, Trimco Moulding and/or Argonaut Insurance Company, by and through 
counsel, answer the Application for Hearing as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. Answering paragraphs 1,2, and 3, respondents admit the same. 
2. Answering paragraph 4, while respondents admit that petitioner was off of work 
for various times, respondents allege that petitioner was appropriately paid temporary total 
disability benefits, over those various times, for eight years following the industrial injury. 
Respondents deny liability for further indemnity benefits as outlined by Utah law. 
1 
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3. Answering paragraph 5, respondents are unaware of any medical expenses 
which have not been paid. To date respondents have paid medical expenses of $237,160.04. 
Respondents have paid indemnity benefits to petitioner in the amount of $14,907.85. This , 
figure includes the payment of a 24% upper extremity impairment in the amount of $2,488.00. 
Please note that petitioner's average weekly wage was only $60.00; thus, his workers 
compensation rate was $45.00 plus $10.00 for dependents for a total of $55.00 per week. 
4. Answering paragraph 6, respondents deny petitioner's average weekly wage 
claim. Respondents further allege that petitioner only had two dependents at the time of 
industrial injury on July 22, 1983. 
5. Respondents deny each and every allegation in the Application for Hearing not 
previously admitted or qualified. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Respondents allege that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65, petitioner in no case is 
entitled to temporary total disability benefits after a period of eight years from the date of the 
injury. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Respondents allege that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65.1, temporary partial 
disability benefits are not payable after eight years following the date of the injury. 
Respondents further allege that, under this statute, petitioner must file an Application for 
Hearing within such eight year period. Respondents deny that petitioner filed his Application 




Respondents allege that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-66, petitioner is not 
entitled to permanent partial disability benefits after the expiration of an eight year period 
following the industrial injury. Respondents allege that it is now well beyond that eight year 
period. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Respondents allege that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99, petitioner's claim for 
compensation must, in any event, be filed within eight years after the date of the industrial 
accident. Respondents deny that petitioner has timely filed an Application for Hearing. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Respondents shall take petitioner's deposition, looking to see whether petitioner had 
any pre-existing conditions. Under the law that existed in 1983, there may be potential 
reimbursement from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund if the pre-existing condition warrants 
such reimbursement. In the event that evidence warrants this claim, respondents shall file an 
Amended Answer in order to join the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. At this point, a copy of 
this Answer has been sent to the Employers' Reinsurance Fund as a courtesy, pending the 
outcome of respondents further investigation. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Respondents are willing to mediate the present claim. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Respondents are unaware of any medical expense which has been denied to petitioner, 
putting petitioner to his proof in this regard. 
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WHEREFORE, having answered the AppMcation for Hearing, respondents pray that 
the same be denied and dismissed. 
DATED this &' _ day of /lkX,j , 2004 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
MICHAEL E. DYER, Atto/pfey for Respondents 
Trimco Moulding and/or i ^onau t Insurance 
Company 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO 
APPLICATION FOR HEARING by first-class mail, postage prepaid, this day of 
^ 2004, to: 
Richard Grint 
5580 Capri Drive 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Argonaut Insurance Company 
c/o Pamela LawsorJ 
P.O. Box 5836 
Boise, Idaho 83705 
grint answer 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
ADJUDICATION DIVISION 
PO Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
801-530-6800 
RICHARD D GRINT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
Case No. 20040182 
Judge Dale W Sessions 
THIS MATTER came before the Labor Commission for hearing pursuant to Notice of 
Hearing on February 16, 2005 in Salt Lake City. Present at the hearing were Mr. Richard D. 
Grint, Petitioner, pro se (without an attorney), and the Respondent was represented by Michael 
Dyer, Esq. 
The ALJ took testimony and listened to arguments of Counsel. Mr. Dyer had not filed 
the medical record exhibit because he believed that the matter should be resolve as a matter of 
law on the legal theory advanced by him. The ALJ requested that the medical record exhibit be 
filed and a copy provided to Petitioner. On or about February 17, 2005 the medical exhibit was 
filed with the Labor Commission. The evidentiary record for the hearing was then closed. 
This case presents some very unique issues and has an extraordinary history. The 
medical record exhibit exceeds approximately 600 pages. 
THE ALJ having first held a hearing on the matter, being advised in the premises and 
having reviewed the records and exhibits before the Labor Commission now enters 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
as follows: 
1. Petitioner was injured within the scope and course of his employment by industrial 
accident on July 23, 1983. 
2. Petitioner has established both medical and legal causation in satisfaction of the 
requirements of Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). This is not 
disputed by any party. 
3. Petitioner was loading a flat-bed truck with lumber. He pulled upward on a tie-down 
rope which snapped under the pressure. Petitionei fell backward from the truck bed 
to the ground a distance of approximately 5 or 6 feet. Petitioner extended his arm out 
to cushion the fall. When he hit the ground, hand first, his elbow broke. 
4. Petitioner was earning $14.00 per hour and working 20 hours per week. However see 
paragraph 18 below regarding a math error on the compensation agreement which 
invalidates $55.00 per week as his average weekly rate and his compensation rate. 
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5. Petitioner had a spouse and 2 children who were dependents at that time. 
6. During 1985 Petitioner entered into a Compensation Agreement with the Labor 
Commission approval and he received benefits: 
7. In the intervening years, Petitioner has undergone 39 surgical procedures on his elbow 
related to the industrial accident. They are detailed in the medical exhibit which is 
incorporated by this reference as if set forth in full here. There is no dispute as to the 
extent of the medical records or treatment received. 
8. Petitioner's testimony is un-rebutted that he took a conservative approach to the 
treatment(s) that he allowed. One primary motivation he expressed was that at the 
time of the injury he was told that perhaps he would have one opportunity to have an 
elbow replacement during his life. He hoped that technology would improve over 
time and that he would be better off to wait and see. During the waiting period, he 
took the opportunity to have conservative treatments until he had no real option but 
seek the elbow replacement. 
9. Respondent has paid medical benefits of nearly $300,000.00 to date. Petitioner 
established at the hearing that there may be one medical bill which was not paid. He 
agreed to submit it to Mr. Dyer for review. 
10.lt is undisputed that the medical expenses and/or costs in this case are and will be paid 
by Respondent. 
11 .Petitioner has recently graduated from the University of Utah with a bachelor's degree 
in Computer Systems and Petitioner is now seeking employment in that field. It is 
undisputed that Petitioner at this time is not seeking permanent total disability 
compensation and that we proceed on the amended application for hearing which 
advances only the issue of increased impairment in permanent partial disability at a 
rate higher than the original rate. 
12.The Medical Record Exhibit was intentionally not submitted by Counsel at or before 
the hearing on the Application for Hearing erroneously based upon the size of the 
record, the lack of certain disputes and the fact that Respondent's Counsel believed 
that the matter would be disposed of on a legal basis rather than a factual one. 
13. Over time, Petitioner's physical condition has worsened. It is now uncontroverted 
that Petitioner's impairment rating is 44% whole person as stated on the Summary of 
Medical Record submitted with the Application for Hearing. This is a material 
increase over the previous determination that the impairment rating is 14% whole 
person. In part, the increase of the impairment rating is due to the bad result of the 
surgery done in April 2002. 
14.The previous orders in this case as related to the compensation that this Petitioner 
should receive are inadequate and unfair to the Petitioner. Petitioner has attempted 
conservative treatment which ultimately failed and he was left with a final 
replacement surgery which ended in a bad result. His impairment is now more 
significant than before. 
15.Petitioner was making progress with conservative medical protocol until he had no 
choice. Then, it is unfortunate that the surgery anticipated to help him actually 
caused him more severe injury and limited use of his hand and forearm. 
16.Respondents stipulated at hearing that if his medical bills are related to his arm, they 
are going to pay them. 
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17.Petitioner was approximately 24 years old when the accident occurred. He was in 
good health. To this day he appears before the Commission with extraordinary 
motivation and intellect and no other adverse health issues but those of his industrial 
accident. At the time of his injury, he was earning wages at a rate higher than the 
state average weekly rate. It is reasonable to conclude and I so find that over this 
length of time he would have been earning the state maximum rate for Temporary 
Total Disability compensation as well as Permanent Partial Disability compensation. 
18. A careful review of the Compensation Agreement in this case shows that at the time it 
was prepared, inaccurate information was used or a mathematical error occurred 
which should be adjusted and corrected. The compensation agreement (Exhibit #1) 
was inadequate and unfair to Petitioner from the outset. Both the average weekly rate 
and the computation rate were in error. 
THE ALJ having first entered findings of fact, now enters 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
in this matter as follows: 
19. Stoker v. The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah and the Industrial 
Commission for the State of Utah, 889 P.2d 409 (Utah 1994) establishes that "[i]t 
would be ironic for the Act to be construed in such a fashion that a worker who 
undertakes a conservative course of therapy within the time allowed by the statute, 
which if effective would save the Fund money and be less risky to the worker, would 
be denied benefits when that course proves ineffective and a more aggressive therapy 
must then be pursued, resulting in temporary total disability that occurs outside the 
eight-year period. Had the more aggressive therapy been undertaken at the time of the 
less aggressive therapy, Stoker would have met the requirements for additional total 
disability benefits." 
The Court then notes that in the Stoker case, the Plaintiff experienced a period of 
temporary total disability related to his industrial accident while employed more than 
8 years after his industrial accident. Then the Court requires that Plaintiff be put to his 
proof before the Industrial Commission to prove that any continuing problem is 
reasonably related to his industrial accident. 
The Court then quotes the statute, recognizing that the "Commission has 
continuing jurisdiction to modify its prior award [citing 35-1-78 now re-numbered as 
34A-2-420] and reminding the Commission that it has no power to change the statute 
of limitations. 
The rationale of the Court in Stoker may amount to a conflict within the statute. 
However, this ALJ takes the view that the Court was clarifying the limitation of the 
statute making certain that the Labor Commission cannot change the statute of 
limitations, but remains empowered to adjust the prior orders of the Labor 
Commission when necessary. 
20. In the present case, there is no attempt to adjust the statute of limitations. 
However, the ALJ believes that in the interest of the injured applicant, a remedy is 
available and with prudent exercise of the powers vested in the Labor Commission by 
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the legislature, adjusting the prior order which was inadequate, unfair and erroneous 
from the outset. The mathematical errors contained thereon should be corrected in 
this Order. In addition, Utah Code Ann., S34A-2-409(4) permits the ALJ to adjust 
the wages for increase over time where appropriate. 
21. Avis v. Board of Review (Industrial Commission), 837 P.2d 584 (UT Ct.App. 1992) 
discusses the applicability of the 3 year statute of limitations for filing the initial claim 
under code §35-1-99. Significantly, the Court states that "[Discretion is granted to 
the Commission's application of the law to particular facts only when 'there is a grant 
of discretion to the agency concerning the language in question, either expressly made 
in the statute or implied from the statutory language.'" Stokes v. Board of Review, 832 
P.2d 56 (Utah 1992) (quoting Morton Intl. Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State 
Tax Comm % 814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 1991) other citations omitted. 
An important discussion is found in footnote 2 of that opinion. There the Court 
states "A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits, temporary 
partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total 
disability benefits is wholly barred, unless an application for hearing is filed with the 
commission within six years after the date of the accident. 
In the case at bar, Petitioner succeeded in obtaining an approved compensation 
agreement within approximately 2 years of the date of the accident. No one has 
disputed the timeliness of the filing of the Application for Hearing. 
THE ALJ having entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, now enters the 
ORDER 
of the Labor Commission as follows: 
22.Petitioner is awarded increased permanent partial disability compensation in the 
amount as computed using a 44% whole person impairment rating for a period of 312 
weeks from November 3, 2003 the date he stabilized at the 44% whole person 
impairment. Petitioner's compensation rate is $207.00 per week (the statutory 
maximum rate). 
23.Petitioner is awarded increased temporary total disability compensation at the rate of 
$300.00 per week (the statutory maximum rate) from April 2, 2002 (date of surgery) 
to November 20, 2003 (date of stabilization). Further, Petitioner is awarded 
temporary total disability compensation at the corrected amount of $202.00 from the 
date of injury July 23, 1983 for 312 weeks. 
24.Petitioner is awarded interest on this award at the statutory rate of 8% per annum on 
all sums due under this order from the time the payments should have been made 
until actually paid. 
25.Petitioner has no attorney and no attorney fee is awarded. 
26.Petitioner's medical bills are to be paid promptly when submitted by the treating 
physician, by Petitioner himself or by his counsel so long as they relate to the injury 
of his elbow. Disputes (if any) as to the payment thereof should be submitted to the 
Labor Commission under a formal and new Application for Hearing to resolve the 
dispute. 
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27.Respondent is granted an offset of the amounts previously paid as permanent partial 
disability and temporary total disability compensation. 
DATED March 23, 2005. 
\ ~ Dale W Sessions 
Administrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on February 17, 2005, to the 
persons/parties at the following addresses: 
Richard D Grint 
5580 Capri Dr 
Murray UT 84123 
Argonaut Insurance Company 
P O Box 5836 
Boise ID 83705 
Michael Dyer Esq 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
UTAH LABOR CO^MISSJP 
s i—-—" "" / 
y* S ^'-
Clerk; Adjudication Division 
PO Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
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Richard R. Burke #6843 
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
648 East 100 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-1700 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1780 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
RICHARD D. GRINT, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
TRIMCO MOLDING and/or ARGONAUT,; 
INSURANCE COMPANY, ; 
Respondents. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
) RICHARD D. GRINT 
) Case No. 20040182 
) Judge Dale W. Sessions 
Richard D. Grint, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am over eighteen years of age, and have personal knowledge of the contents of this 
affidavit. 
2. On 7/22/1983,1 injured my arm in the course and scope of my employment with Trimco. 
3. During the week of my accident, I was scheduled to work 20 hours. My rate of pay was 
$14.00 per hour. I put this information on my application for hearing. 
4. I was paid by check for my work at Trimco. I saved some of my paystubs from around 
the time of my industrial accident. I sent these paystubs to my claims adjuster, who then 
prepared a compensation agreement for me to sign. See letter of 6/5/84 to Bonnie 
Rockwood, with attachments. 
5. I have never stated that I was earning $4.00 per hour at the time of my 7/22/1983 
GCM-29 
industrial accident. 
6. I only had one employer at the time of my industrial accident. They were called Tiimco. 
Some of my paystubs also identify my employer as "Hoff Companies," and "Hoff 
Companies, Inc., DBA Trimco Molding." See paystubs and payroll advance ot 5/2/1983, 
attached to this affidavit. 
7. Through the State of Utah Vocational Rehabilitation, I have attended school to enable me 
to find work that I can do despite my arm injuries. Through that program, I was attending 
the University of Utah around the time of my last surgery, and did not earn wages 
between my date of surgery on 4/23/2002 and 11/30/2003. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this /2T) day of June, 2005 by 
r —1SLT" ~ ""^ Notary Public """ "* 
USA BALDWIN | 
648Eait 100South,$uto2G0 • 
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7-22-83 
Dear Bonnie, 
As per our converstlon, here is a copy of several paychecks as you requested. 
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THE COURT: All right, this is vh, Judge 
Sessions, we're uh, (inaudible) admission-hearing 
number 332 (inaudible) approximately or. (inaudible; 
matter of Richard Grint (inaudible). 
Male2: Morning. 
Male3: Morning. 
THE COURT: All right. (Inaudible). 
Male3: Good. 
THE COURT: Uh, parties, Mr. Grint is here 
and Mr. Dryer's here (inaudible) forward (inaudible) 
so, uh, let's talk about that for just a second. Mr. 
Grint, what is it you expect to happen in this hearing 
today? 
MR. GRINT: Uh, the reason I'm here to begin 
with is for a evaluation on the disability impairment 
primarily. Urn, there seems to be some disagreement 
between myself and the insurance company on whether 
they should be liable for monies due I guess because of 
the increased impairment. That and, I have some unpaid 
medical bills. Those 
THE COURT: 
that (inaudible). Mr. 
MR. DYER: 
Mr. Grint on a couple 
are the primary. 
Uh, I have a few questions about 
Dyer, let's hear from you. 
Uh, your honor, I've talked to 
of occasions now, urn, most 
1 recently yesterday, And he says that he has an uh, j 




























unpaid medical bill in the amount of, 3 think it's in 
the amount of a hundred and eight dollars. 
THE COURT: I'll look at it again 
(inaudible) two hundred and two actually. 
MR. DYER: Uh, ok, I mean, we^e not too 
concerned about that as long as there's some rational 
basis for the bill, urn, I've got the most recent 
printout. So far we've paid in medical expenses alone 
two hundred and forty eight thousand seven hundred nine 
dollars and eighty-three cents. Mr. Grint's had more 
procedures performed on his arm than anyone, I think, 
in the state of Utah, probably in the western United 
States. By my count, it's like 39 different surgical 
procedures on his arm. 
MR. GRINT: I'd be inclined to agree with 
that. 
MR. DYER: And it's just enormous uh, he's 
had that luck with his arm. Urn. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
MR. DYER: Yea, uh, it's, and uh, and my 
client has obviously agreed to, I think it was a 
comp 
Mr. 
> e n s a b l e i 
G r i n t was 
MR. 
MR. 
n j u r y 
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I was young. 
He was a young kid. 
How old are you now MZ. Grdnt^ 
45 . 
Ok. (Inaudible). 
So, I've, I've, I've looked high 
and low frankly for any pre-existing condition because, 
given the law in 1983, if I could find any pre-existing 
condition, my client would be entitled to some portion 
upon the employer's insurance fund. And I, 
unfortunately because he was so young, Mr. Grint was 
healthy and I couldn't find anything wrong with him. 
(Laughter). I mean, I looked everywhere, I tried to 
explain it, you know, look, this is actually to his 
benefit because of the other pre-existing condition. 
In 1983, he actually gets paid for the pre-existing 
condition. But I you know, he was 23 and he didn't 
have, he didn't wear glasses, I think he still doesn't 
wear glasses, but he doesn't have high blood pressure, 
doesn't have all the kind of things happen to people as 
they get older because he was so young at the time so, 
uh, we're stuck with accepting the client, uh, which 
was done back in 1983. The, uh, the only bad news I 
guess for Mr. G r m t is that he wasn't making very much 
money at the time, uh, so his comp rate is only 55 
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1 I dollars a week which is not a very high worker's ccmp 
2 rate. Uh, he was rated initially urn, by Dr. Johnson 
3 Horn. I think he was one of the initial treating 
4 doctors although, frankly, every doctor who has any 
5 expertise in upward extremity I think hasr looked at Mr. 
6 Grint. I did make a copy of the medical record exhibit 
7 for the, for the court. I didn't really see that it 
8 was relevant, it's enormous and I, I, but if you would 
9 like to have a copy, I, trust me, I'll make you one. 
10 THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
11 MR. DYER: (Inaudible) Right, right, and so 
12 I thought that I would explain it, and if you want one, 
13 uh, that's great, uh, I've collected most of them. Dr. 
14 Horn rated Mr. Grint urn, in June of 1984 as having a 
15 twenty four percent impairment of the upper extremity. 
16 And based on that, urn, 
17 MR. GRINT: Uh, that comes out to 14 percent 
18 of the whole man. 
19 MR. DYER: 14 percent, ok. 
20 MR. GRINT: (Inaudible) rating. 
21 MR. DYER: That's, that's correct. And so 
12 I based on that they entered into a compensation 
23 agreement (inaudible). 
M , MR. GRINT: Yea, I've got a copy of that 
- 5 I right here. 




























MR. DYER: Um, (inaudible) copy of course, i 
didn't know if you filed a civil (inaudible)) 
MR. GRINT: That's not, so (Inaudible). 
MR. DYER: So they entered into a 
compensation agreement and made benefits at the 24 
percent upper extremity impairment rating. It outlined 
the temporary trouble disability benefits that paid in 
the case up to that point. And signed by Mr. Grint and 
Bonny Rockwood at the time was handling for the uh, 
carrier. Mr. Grint had ongoing medical treatments. 
He's had ongoing medical treatments even up to the 
present really. And he was seen on a couple of 
additional occasions after additional procedures urn, 
first by Dr. Martin Green III who's a specialist in 
upper extremities and I might as well give you this 
stuff too. I made some copies of the medical records 
that I thought might be you know, 
MR. GRINT: Is that the letter from Martin 
Green about the rating? 
MR. DYER: Right. 
MR. GRINT: I've got the original here too. 
MR. DYER: Yea. and so I iust made a CODV. 
MR. GRINT: Ok. 
MR. DYER: So, Dr. Green saw Mr. Grint in, 
first in May of 1987, and he said yea, I think the 24 




























percent impairment rating is still right and chey saw 
him again in 1991 and he a bunch of other procedures 
done on his uh, arm and this time he approved the 23 
percent upper extremity impairment, which still 
calculated to 14 percent all body so, no real change. 
MR. GRINT: Can I say something here just 
one second though? On this first letter from Jonathan 
Horn, the very first rating, very last paragraph of 
that letter. 
THE COURT: I (inaudible) have a copy of 
that letter. 
MR. DYER: Uh, let me just give him a copy 
of that impairment rating. 
MR. GRINT: (inaudible) Dr. Horn, that was 
just the original rating on which the compensation 
agreement was based. 
THE COURT: Ok, this is the only copy that I 
have, right here, I did not make any copies. So, is it 
possible for you to make a copy of this? 
Male2: First (inaudible) I need to 
(inaudible) letter (inaudilbreO. 
MR. GRINT: This is the original impairment 
rating from Jonathan Horn that talks about the 24 
percent impairment with the upper extremity, 14 percent 
entire (inaudible). It's original rating. 
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Male2: (Inaudible) look at that for a 
second. 
MR. GRINT: (Inaudible) not in very great 
shape. I've had it for quite a few years. 
Male2: (Inaudible) comes from. Thau's where 
this (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Mr. Dyer (inaudilbeO. 
MR. DYER: I'm sure I have it in here, I, I 
uh, probably reviewed it and just made a note not 
thinking that it was. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) repaired the 
(inaudible) in 1984? 
MR. DYER: On yea. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. DYER: Great. I, uh, it's a situation 
where he was (inaudible) and then he would have an 
additional procedure on his arm and so he'd be unstable 
for you know, 
THE COURT: I see. 
MR. DYER: Six weeks, they'd pay more 
benefits and then, he's over and then he'd have yet 
another procedure on his arm and then another procedure 
on his arm. 
MR. GRINT: Yea, I would (knaudilbeO call 
your attention to the very last paragraph in there that 
DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188 
W» M o l 


























says that uh, there is arthritis set in ard tnere are 
other things going on and there is a very good 
possibility that in the future the disability rating 
will go up and that's, right from the very beginning 
they know that there was a possibility tn?t t n s is 
going to increase. 
THE COURT: Oh, ok, ok. 
MR. DYER: (Inaudible) I have, I'm pretty 
sure I have. Uh, and I was then going to show I think, 
this was attached to the application right here and I 
think this is what creates the controversy. This is 
summary of medical evidence prepared by Dr. Chris 
(inaudible) Martin. 
THE COURT: Yes. I remember (inaudilbeO. 
MR. GRINT: Yea. 
Male2: Do you know who 
MR. GRINT: Yes. That's a doctor that is 
currently treating me now. 
Male2: What's his name? 
MR. GRINT: Chris Martin, Christopher 
Martin. Now, one thing that I do need. 
Male2. (Inaudible) is. 
MR. GRINT: I started with Dr. Jonathan Horn 
urn, I wasn't particularly happy with the treatment that 
I was getting from him. The insurance company ^ __ 




























themselves actually sent me to Mark Green and T was 
under Green's care for quite awhile and then the 
insurance company sent me to a Don Colemar at the 
University. 
Male2: Really? The insurance company did? 
MR. GRINT: Yes, and then the insurance 
company sent me to uh, Douglas Hutchinson at the 
University and I was treated with Hutchinson for 
probably 10 years or more easy until he kind of had a 
major snafu and then the insurance company sent me to 
uh, this Christensen. But, Douglas Hutchinson also did 
a new rating in October of 2001, which is right here. 
THE COURT: I may not have seen that one. 
MR. GRINT: And this one here is a new 
rating that he did and the thing is with the insurance 
company when I talked to them about this rating before, 
it was consistently increasing uh, another thing also I 
want to mention about all of these surgeries and I do 
have a couple of correspondence from the some of the 
doctors in here to back this up if you want to read it 
but, I've had 39 or 40 surgeries something like that. 
I've lost count. I've had so dang many of them thac 
it's just unbelievable. The reason for that is I had 
such a severe injury to my elbow that they knew 
eventually I would have to have it replaced with an 




























artificial elbow. Unfortunately the technology is not 
that great in artificial elbows. Consequently, they 
don't like to do it until they absolutely have to, 
until there is no alternative. They prefer to put it 
off until you are in your sixties. Me being in my 30's 
roughly at the time, most of this was going on, they 
felt like it was better to prolong that procedure as 
long as possible because they knew it wouldn't last. 
THE COURT: Ok, hang on for just a second. 
We're kind of verging into an area where I may want to 
consider what you're saying is evidence and in order to 
do that I'm gonna have to have you under oath to 
testify. 
MR. GRINT: Ok. 
THE COURT: So, preliminarily, I'd like to 
(inaudible) preliminarily where we are and then 
(inaudilbeO severity. 
MR. DYER: And let me just, if I can, just 
based upon the rating from Dr. Martin's obviously 
increased, so the question is, ok, do we owe the 
increase? Uh, the law at the time in 1981 however, 
allowed for 8 years of obtaining permanent partial 
impairment benefits and my client takes the view that 
it's now beyond 8 years since 1983, you know, long 
beyond that. So, urn, we recognize that there is no 




























statute of limitations for a perm total cLaint, thac was 
Meechum versus industrial commission case, it's about a 
1987 case. Uh, but Mr. Grint isn't claiming total 
permanent total disability benefits in fact, he 
recently graduated from the University of Utah uh, in 3 
years rather than 4 years and had a 3.6 GPA. I even 
thought about trying to get a, some kind of a mental 
impairment as a pre-existing condition but the guy's 
smart, so, he's not making a claim for perm-total the 
only claim for indemnity benefits is for the increase 
in impairment and unfortunately under the law, urn, he's 
not entitled to an increase this far down the road. 
But it is that total permanent impairment that I am 
seeking claim for that increase in total permanent 
impairment. 
THE COURT: Well. 
MR. GRINT: Not seeking^ 
MR. DYER: Permanent partial impairment is 
what's it's called. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
MR. DYER: Uh, right, right, so uh, frankly, 
his rate urn, at the 55 dollars per week is comp rate. 
The increase is only worth about 4 thousand dollars. 
It's not even something that we probably fight over 
other than the fact that it's kind of apparent to the 
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law that, that's the way it is. Given the fact that 
we've paid almost two hundred thousand dolDais just in 
medicals on the case. 
MR. GRINT: Right. 
MR. DYER: You know, to fight over 4 
thousand dollars isn't the big thing, which is again, 
why I didn't make copies of all of the enormous medical 
records and there's two hundred dollars that are 
outstanding that as it relates in any way to his arm, 
we'll pay the bill and that's no big deal. Urn, it's 
amazing that with two hundred and fifty thousand 
medicals that something more than two hundred dollars 
hasn't slipped through the cracks but, uh, I think 
that's really the only issue for the court to decide, 
1, um, is there urn a legal basis for awarding an 
increase in permanent impairment uh, 22 years after the 
event uh, and second, do we owe the two hundred dollars 
in medical bills and if we could look at the bill we 
could probably stipulate on the record whether it 
relates to his arm or not. If it relates, we stipulate 
to pay it and if it relates to his, something, some 
other body part that we probably wouldn't pay it but 
that's, that's about all that we have I think to take 
care of today. 




























MR. GRINT: When I talked to the industrial 
commission about this impairment rating, they tpld j.e 
over the phone that the insurance company was 
responsible for payment. 
THE COURT: Why don't you hang on. 
MR. GRINT: On that increase so. 
THE COURT: Hang on just a minute. Is there 
anything else Mr. Dyer you think? 
MR. DYER: No, I think that's really it as 
far as what is before the court for adjudication. 
THE COURT: Ok. 
MR. DYER: That's basically it. 
THE COURT: Ok, Mr. Grint, I know that you 
have information you're (Laughter) (Inaudible). Anxious 
to hear about, urn, some things and I do have some 
questions that I'd like to ask you urn, and so I'd like 
you to be under oath to do that.. 
MR. GRINT: Ok. ! 
right 
THE COURT: 
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MR. 
THE 
























































MR. GRINT: Ok. 
THE COURT: Ok, I, uh, haye a /er> 
abbreviated file in this case. I show that there's an 
application for hearing (inaudible) a little bit and 
tell you what's here. Uh, and see ho w tiidt all rGlatpc! 
without having any medical information course, it looks 
like nothing happened in this case but apparently, 
there's a significant amount of things that happened. 
Uh, I have application for hearing in the file that 
filed on March the first of last year. 
MR. GRINT: Right. 
THE COURT: And in that hearing, urn, you 
weren't claiming total permanent disability. You 
marked the box. 








Then, on the 25th of March. 
I think that was an error. 
(Inaudible). 
It was all mistaken. 
And, perm total disability was 
Ok. 
THE COURT: On t h e new a p p l i c a t i o n so I ' m 
a s s u m i n g t h a t what y o u ' r e c l a i m i n g r e l a t e s t o t h a t 
a p p l i c a t i o n . 
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The 25th. Ok we're not 
Page 
discussing permanent total disability. 
MR. GRINT: Right. 
THE COURT: Ok. 
MR. GRINT: Right, I am not permanently 
totally disabled. 
THE COURT: Ok, we appreciate your 
recognizing that. Now there's some terms of 
(inaudible) (Laughter). You know, the terminations but, 
urn, so you were injured in July of 1983 and I cannot 
determine when you first filed a claim with the 
industrial commission except I have these uh, things 
noted in the file. IN the year 2002, a form 123 was 
filed which was the initial report of worker's injury 
or occupational disease. And that was attached to your 
application form. I also have, the dates are very hard 
for me (inaudible) I believe it says 02 the way that 
uh, punch out date is difficult to read sometimes. 
MR. GRINT: Ok, so, what you want is a copy 
then of the original. 
THE COURT: Hang on, hang on, it, the, ail 
the things I have and then we'll sort it out. 
MR. GRINT: Ok. 
THE COURT: In 1995, I have a copy of your 




























initial vocational assessment. 
MR. GRINT: I don't know wh$t that is. 
THE COURT: And, I have a copy of form 2 06 
which was filed for the commission reporting a status 
update on your condition and it's marked the original 
report of assessment of need. Ok. Those are the only 
documents that are, that have been provided to the 
commission. They are the only documents in the file and 
so again, my first question is, uh, do you have in your 
possession any other documents that indicate that prior 
to 1995, you filed a claim for benefits with the labor 
commission? 
MR. GRINT: Uh, yes I do. I have all of the 
originals. Let's see. I think. (Inaudible) right. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) Mr. Grint. 
MR. GRINT: U, the only, I haven't seen any 
application for hearing, the only thing that looks like 
it's labor commissions (inaudible) on it is the 
compensation agreement that I just gave to the court. 
That was approved by Robert Ellisario(?) at the time 
labor commission legal council October 30, 1985. 
MR. DYER: You know, I do have the originals 
and I looked at them this morning. 
MR. GRINT: But I think that's the only 
thing. 




























MR. DYER: And I don't know if I actually 
brought them with me. The very first original 
application, the accident report that was filad with 
the industrial commission. I actually looked sit it 
this morning and I, honestly do not believe that I 
brought it with me. It was microfilm filed. It was 
printed out for me. But I do have that. 
THE COURT: And it wouldn't surprise me if 
there was a first report of injury. I mean, the claim 
was accepted as compensable, the benefits paid. I 
don't think there was any dispute in that regard. 
MR. DYER: Yea, I actually did look at it 
this morning, it was uh, it was pulled up off of a 
microfilm. 
THE COURT: (inaudible). 
MR. DYER: In fact, that's where I think 
his copy of this, of this report came from. There was 
a copy of this report on microfilm there was a copy of 
that first initial injury. 
Male2: (Inaudible). I'm not sure what you're 
referring to. You're holding up. 
MR. DYER: This, yea, this is that comp 
agreement. 
THE COURT: Ok, uh, I haven't (inaudible). 
Just so the record doesn't start getting blurred I'm 
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gonna mark these. 
MR. DYER: It's all-good, it's all-qoodL 
THE COURT: Gentlemen the comp agreement, 
the comp agreement is going to be marked exhibit number 
5 1. And then, while I'm marking things, I'm going to 
mark uh, Mr. Green's letter of 1987 as number 2. Uh, 
I'm going to mark Mr. Green's 1991 letter as exhibit 
number 3. Is there any objection to me receiving these 
into the record? 
MR. DYER: None. 
MR. GRINT: No. 
THE COURT: Ok, they are received and the 
record shows that. Uh, let's see, while we're also 
doing that, it's already in the file but I'm going to 
formally accept in my the summary of medical records 
for Dr. Martin and it's number 4. (Inaudible) number 
for the case; is there any objection to receiving that? 
MR. DYER: None. 
MR. GRINT: No. 
THE COURT: Ok, those 4 documents are 
received. All right, then, uh, I, uh I believe that 
what: we're abouc to discuss, Mr. Grint, is the 
application of the law. 
MR. GRINT: Umhm. 
THE COURT: Investigating through here there 




























was a statute of limitations which, (inaudible) 
compensation to be concluded within 8 year?. That has 
subsequently been modified but, under tne teim thac 
existed at the time of your injury, the law the applied 
is that 8 statute of limitations. Urn, so, Mr. Dyer, by 
looking to you, I, I've seen your response to his 
pleading and you set out the statute and. 
MR. DYER: Yep. 
THE COURT: I can see clearly what you're 
argument is there. Uh, do you have anything that you 
want to add to your responses? 
MR. DYER: No, I think that you're right, 
while it has been modified since that time, but, we're 
kind of, stuck with the law at the time of the injury 
and so urn, you know, we've discussed settlement, we've 
tried to you know, tried to discuss settlement, it's 
mostly medical question, the impairment being 
relatively minor given his rate. Urn, Mr. Grint's 
obviously concerned about future medical expenses given 
that (inaudible) number that have been performed 
already. My client is uh, understandably thinking that 
gee, after 39 or 40 procedures and he, now has had the 
artificial urn, elbow replacement that it's not likely 
we're gonna have a repeat of all the stuff that we've 
already paid for so far which is about two hundred and 




























fifty thousand dollars so, we, we've baen kind of 
looking in a relatively modest range uh, you know, less 
than 6 figures to settle this case and Mr. Grint is 
concerned and he's thinking more about a half a million 
dollars to settle the case and we're, that's Kind of 
far enough apart that, that, no, we're just figuring 
that we'll just take our chances you know, we'll see 
what happens to him and, and, with any luck, he won't 
even repeat the 3 9 procedures that he's had already and 
that would be a lot less than that in the future. Uh, 
maybe he'll have bad luck and he'll have 3 9 more 
procedures but you know, probably not. And so that's 
why we have viewed the future potential exposure for 
medical expenses uh, at a range at far less than does 
Mr. Grint and you know, I guess my client is entitled 
to its view on that, Mr. Grint is entitled to his, uh, 
but, we haven't been able to bridge that difference in 
order to reach a settlement and so I think this is a 
case where we'll just keep medicals open and whatever 
happens, happens and hopefully it won't be bad. Urn, 
uh, but given the state of the law at the time, I, I, 
unless the change, the plan changes to permanent total 
disability, and for that, I, I acknowledge that there's 
no statue of limitations at the time in 1983. Uh, then 
I think his claim for ongoing indemnity benefits is 
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THE COURT: All right Mr. Grint. Uh, I know 
you're proceeding without council but you 3till nave 
the still have the same burden in terms of bringing any 
information to me that you want me to consider that 
rebuts Mr. Dyer's argument or helps me just find some 
reason to disregard the statute of limitations imposed 
by the legislature in 1983 at the time of your 
accident. Do you know of any such law that would allow 
me to do so? 
MR. GRINT: Well, personally I don't know of 
any such law but, the reason I'm here to begin with was 
because when this impairment rating was increased, 
based off the information that I was given at the time 
my original impairment rating was done, I was told at 
that time that should this rating increase in the 
future, then I would be compensated for the increase. 
I was told at that time that there wasn't a time limit. 
Now, I talked. 
THE COURT: You were told all of this by 
whom? 
MR. GRINT: The insurance adjuster's CW 
Reese that was in charge of the case at the time, 
acting for Argonaut Insurance Company. 
THE COURT: You showed me a document earlier 




























but I didn't receive it into the record. You indicated 
that it was your only original copy and I don't have ^ 
copy machine here. But is that the document that you 
were referring to that changes your impairment rating? 
MR. GRINT: This is the original impairment 
rating that was done and it indicates on here that the 
impairment rating will probably increase in the future. 
THE COURT: And so it was speculating that 
(inaudible) in the future it'd bring. 








MR. GRINT: When this impairment rating 
increased. 
THE COURT: Which was wnen? 
MR. GRINT: Urn, well it's actually been 
increasing throughout the years and through my 
conversations with the insurance company, and they're 
various representatives, I was told I would be better 
off to wait until we've reached some stable point 
before an impairment rating was done. 
THE COURT: Ok, so when, when do you, what 
2 5 J can you show me that indicates when, you did reach some 
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sort of stabilization and the impairment rr_ting 
changed? 
MR. GRINT: The biggest stable impairment 
rating where they finally said ok, this is where we 
believe you're not going to get any better was in 2001, 
October, and that was done by Douglas Hutchinson, Dr. 
Douglas Hutchinson at the University of Utah who had 
been treating me for the prior 10 years. And he 
increased my impairment rating at that particular time, 
let me pull that letter real quick and I'll give you a 
copy of that, up to the 22 percent of the whole person, 
then, this was October 30th, of 2001, and then the 
decision was made in April of 2002 to go ahead and do 
an artificial elbow replacement and so that was done. 
Unfortunately there were some things done during that 
procedure that basically crippled my right arm. There 
was some nerves that were damaged and caused me to 
actually lose the entire use of my right hand. That 
caused my impairment to go up dramatically and that's 
where this other impairment from Dr. Martin come in. 
And that's when I left Douglas Hutchinson and went over 
to Dr. Christopher Martina and that was also on 
recommendation of the insurance company. There were 
some mistakes made during that surgery that with nerves 
that. Basically I've lost all of the feeling down 
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here. I have no feeling at all in my hand anymore so 
that' s why the impairment rating then again jumped 
within 1 year from 22 to 44 percent so. 
Male2: Aren't (inaudible) times (inaudible) 
statute of limitations (inaudible) damage? 
MR. GRINT: Throughout all of the surgeries, 
I have had parts taken out of both legs twice. 
Male2: Ok. 
MR. GRINT: To rebuild my elbow. I've got 
scars that go from my hips to my knees where I've had 
parts taken out to rebuild them. Like I was starting 
to say before, the reason I had so many surgeries was 
because the technology in an artificial is not that 
great. They don't replace any more than a hundred or 
two hundred a year throughout the United States. 
THE COURT: I need, I need to ask you a 
question. 
MR. GRINT: Ok. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) too far away from I 
















right hand correct? 
Yes. 
And you lost (inaudible). 
Yes . 
To use it? J 
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MR. GRINT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Ok. And, 
MR. GRINT: In a normal nand, you can take 
and spread your fingers out and move them, in my right 
hand, this is what I can do. That's the only finger I 
can move. I can move my thumb great. My right hand, 
that's it. I have had to have all of the tendons in my 
right wrist tied, my hand did one of these claw things. 
And it was stuck there permanent, that was it. They 
had to go in up here, which is what Dr. Christopher 
Martin did, move all the tendons and tie them together 
and in my wrist in here and in my hand up in here, had 
moved the muscles so that the muscles in my forearm 
actually make it so I can bend my fingers now whether 
than all the intrinsic muscles that are in your hand. 
All of these intrinsic muscles that give you all the 
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right where that nerve comes out and starts down 
through the shoulder and down to the arm and that's to 
block the pain down there. There is a?so another 
procedure that they do that kind of replaces that 
that's supposed to rather than have this done once a 
week, it's supposed to increase it to once every 3 
months where they actually go in with two needles into 
the same place and they like burn that nerve. 
THE COURT: And how often did you say that 
they have to do that procedure? 
MR. GRINT: It's either once a week or once 
every three months depending on which procedure they 
do. 
THE COURT: I think that's the radio 
frequency procedure. 
MR. GRINT: Yea, I's the radio frequency 
that's supposed to last every three weeks. 
THE COURT: Three months. 
MR. GRINT: Or every three months, yea. The 
problem with the radio frequency is it's only about 80 
percent effective where the other one's a hundred 
percent effective. But this is ongoing now forever. 
THE COURT: And the insurance company is 
paying for that correct? 
MR. GRINT: It's great fun, I'm sure, at a 
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thousand bucks a week. 
MR. DYER: Well, I don't think it'3 that 
expensive. 
MR. GRINT: (Laughter) Well, the still 
lights are a thousand bucks a week, the other one's, 
I'm not exactly sure what the other one is, but, 
they're awfully expensive and they're awfully painful. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) don't have general 
anesthesia for the procedure or? 
MR. GRINT: They do a anesthesia for the 
radio frequency one, which is, you know, where they 
actually go in and burn the nerve. They put you right 
on the urge of a sleep. They can't have you asleep 
because you have to talk while they do it because that 
particular nerve bundle that comes out of the spinal 
cord also controls your breathing and it also controls 
your speech and that if they get the wrong nerve, you 
can go into I guess repertory arrest, so and, they can 
also burn the one that makes you talk, so they got to 
make sure that they're at the right one. Anyway, like 
I was saying with all of these surgeries, you know, 
they've taken parts out of my legs to rry to rebuild 
the elbow, all of this was an attempt to prolong the 
process of putting in the artificial elbow because I 
was told originally it could only be done once. Once 
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it's done, it's done, there's nothing alse that can be 
done, when it wears out the only option left is to fuse 
the arm. That would mean losing all motion, I'd bv3 
stuck in a permanent whatever. You know, whatever 
position I chose, that's where I'd be stuck at. So, 
consequently, they wanted to put it off as long as 
possible. I'd been told since then that it's possible 
to maybe 2 or 3 times maximum but because they don't do 
that particular procedure very often, there's no 
research done into it; the technology behind the parts 
is not that great, you know, it's not hips and knees 
where they do thousands and thousand of them every 
year. They only do a couple of hundred so they don't 
put the money into it. So the technology isn't that 
great. So, 
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Dyer, question to 
you. 
MR. DYER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Cause I don't have a medical 
record cause I don't. 
MR. DYER: I apologize for that, but I. 
THE COURT: It's ok, I judge cases on, based 
on the past so. Uh, have you had, has there, you 
mentioned before earlier that Mr. Grint's probably seen 
everybody in town? 



























MR. DYER: Well yes, you look at h-s ljst 
and I mean, it includes every specialist I think for 
upper extremities. I could read down to you «f you're 
interested. 
THE COURT: No, no, not at this moment, but, 
thank you, is there, have you, has the insurance 
company ever requested uh, an IMV(?)? 
MR. DYER: Oh yea. 
THE COURT: And is there a competing 
impairment issue? 
MR. DYER: The. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) feeling. 
MR. DYER: The, the last I meeting(?), was 
done by a doctor just before he had his uh, elbow 
replacement surgery, the artificial elbow. 
MR. GRINT: What's an IME? 
MR. DYER: Independent Medical Evaluation. 
MR. GRINT: Ok. 
MR. DYER: And, so we sent to another IME 
say, really, does, this, is this a really good idea? 
And the IME doctor said yea, for him it is. Which is 
why they then said ok and paid for it. 
THE COURT: Ok, did he do an impairment 
rating? 
MR. DYER: He didn't. He said, I can't do 




























an impairment rating because if I do, the uh, u?h, 
surgery to do the elbow replacement that it may, that 
we have to wait and see how he does from the surgery 
before we could get into another impairment rating_. 
MR. GRINT: They've never disputed the 
impairment rating or sent me to anybody for an 
impairment rating. They have sent all over the place 
for other opinion regarding surgeries. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
MR. GRINT: So, now. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) directly to do 
though, just kind of though, well, let me tell what my 
thinking is at his moment. Uh, there's a (inaudible) 
of law. 
MR. GRINT: Right. 
THE COURT: I have, I have to determine if 
there is a legal basis for a departure from the clear 
statute that was in effect at the time of your injury, 
now, that may ultimately bar you from any recovery and 
it may stop anything further in your case except 
ongoing medical. Now, uh, if there is a basis, but you 
haven't brought me one, to uh, circumvent that 
argument, then, then the issue is, what evidence do I 
receive and how can I be sure that the impairment 
rating is correct? And, uh, from what I'm seeing, your 
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testimony Mr. Grint is that this is has bean increasing 
tor a. "Loxug tAw* 8LTV& TYO^ it/ s \ip to 4.4 p^tec^t, 
MR. GRINT: Uhuh. 
THE COURT: Uh, Mr. Dyer's saying that we've 
had it evaluated along the way for medical 
reasonableness but we've n^ver had an impairm 
rating. 
MR. DYER: It's true. 
THE COURT: And so, uh, the impairment 
rating may be an issue to consider by (inaudible) the 
case. 
MR. GRINT: I can show, I do have some 
letters in here from the doctors that show that the 
impairment has been increasing and will probably 
continue to get worse. 
THE COURT: Uh. 
MR. GRINT: But, you know, I don't know if 
you want to see that. 
THE COURT: (inaudible), but yea, that would 
(inaudilbeO. 
MR. GRINT: But what I do. 
THE COURT: All you've brought me is, you 
brought me this Dr. Martin'£• 
MR. GRINT: Final impairment rating. 
THE COURT: That was given the final 
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MR. GRINT: Yea, now what I did, when this 
impairment come out, I called the industrial commission 
and I asked them about it. I says, __is the insursnce 
company liable for this increase?^ And they says, _I 
don't know, we will have to look into it and see__. And 
they researched it and they called me back and they's 
told me yes, they were liable for it. And then, I 
called the insurance company and I told the insurance 
company. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) additional increase? 
MR. GRINT: Uh, I do not know exactly who it 
was who did the initial research and I don't have their 
names written down. 
THE COURT: And where was it at? 
MR. GRINT: It was just, I called the number 
in the phone book for the industrial commission for the 
accidents and talked to one of the girls that answered 
the phone and. 
THE COURT: Obviously there's some 
difficulty in me accepting what you're saying. 
MR. GRINT: Yea. 
THE COURT: Uh. 
MR. GRINT: I can realize that and she 
talked to somebody else and they called me back and 



























they said yes, that they're responsible for it and I 
called the insurance company and talked to them and 
they said no we're not so I called the industrial 
commission back and I says this is what the insurance 
company says, there is an eight year deal and ?he says 
well, I will look into it again and this time I talked 
to a different person. 
THE COURT: Is that when you filed your 
application for hearing? 
MR. GRINT: Yes. That would be the person 
that sent all of the information out to me. 
THE COURT: Ok. (Inaudible) you acknowledge 
that (inaudible) pre dates the event. 
MR. GRINT: This particular person, again, 
went back and researched it, and told me again that 
they were liable for it and I says, well the insurance 
company tells me that they're not and she says flat out 
they are, I've got it right here. 
THE COURT: Well, let me assure you that if 
there was an employee acting like that at the labor 
commission they would be summarily dismissed. That is 
providing legal advice and it's against the law. 
MR. GRINT: Urn, that's, that is exactly what 
they told me and she said that the only way that you're 
going solve this is to file a hearing. 




























THE COURT: Ok. 
MR. GRINT: That's why I filed ic. 
THE COURT: The advise that you received to 
file an application for hearing is fair game, the rest 
of it is not important for my consideration. I can't 
verify that, I can't go back and take care of it. 
MR. GRINT: What I did was then once the 
hearing was filed, I called them back again and I have 
the name written down but in my mass of paperwork I 
would know exactly where to start looking, just tell 
you exactly who it was that I talked to but I do have 
it. I said send me a copy of that so that I've got it 
so that when I walk in the room I don't look like an 
idiot, you know, so I have a copy of that record so 
that I can show it to them and I never did get it. So, 
that, that was what I was told from the industrial 
commission from the people that I talked to was that 
there was no statute in effect at that time. They told 
me that the law changed in 1986, I believe it was, to 8 
years. They said in 1983, there was no statute on 
that. On that, for that partial disability, that. 
MR. DYER- Well, that, that might apply to 
perm total cases. In 1988 they put it, statute of 
limitations on perm totals but, 
MR. GRINT: And that's what I was told. And 
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that's why we're here. 
THE COURT: Ok, well the issue i^, 
(inaudible) uh, to determine if there's a legai basis 
for increasing the impairment rating recognition. z^ nd 
if there is, then, uh, you maybe entitled to some lorm 
of compensation and in some amount that will have to be 
determined. Uh, I uh, I uh, would encourage you to 
provide a copy of whatever bill that you think is 
outstanding (inaudible) relates to your arm. 
MR. GRINT: Umhm. 
THE COURT: To Mr. Dyer so that he could 
discuss that with his client. If they decline to pay 
it, uh, inside of this litigation, you can ask me to 
rule on whether that should be paid or not. 
MR. DYER: My understand is that he's 
actually paid the bill already, so, yes, it's actually 
been paid, we just need to reimburse Mr. Grint but, I, 
we need to get the bill just to know what it was that 
was done.. 
THE COURT: It's almost as if (inaudible) 
not necessary to do it inside the proceeding, but if 
you're alleging that something is unpaid then, at 
least, that's a matter of course.. You have to provide 
it to Mr. Dyer as long as the matter is pending so that 
he can discuss it with his client. 
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MR. GRINT: Umhm. 
THE COURT: My experience has besn they've 
made the determination very quickly about wnether or 
not they're going to pay it. Is there anything else 
that you think needs to come out of this hearing Mr. 
Grint? 
MR. GRINT: Uh, I think that pretty much 
covers it. The only thing is that, you know, they knew 
that this increase has been going on consistently 
throughout that period of time. Uh, I've had other 
areas where I was deliberately misled on time 
restraints by the insurance company where I had to go 
in and fight otherwise where I found out information 
from them otherwise which might have been an 
contributing factor here also. I don't think, you 
know, if there was an 8 year time frame that they were 
aware of, I think they were far less than truthful in 
coming out and saying that otherwise, I would have had 
an impairment rating done then. You know, that 
wouldn't have been questionable because I was under 
treatment at the time and it was ongoing and 
consistent. There's no reason why I wouldn't nave had 
an impairment rating done. That wouldn't have made any 
sense. You know, so, 
THE COURT: Mr. Dyer has asked if I had the 
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MR. GRINT: Oh ok, that's rot a problem. 
MR. DYER: Uh, the only reason I've made a 
couple of the pages of. 
THE COURT: I understand. 
MR. DYER: what people have made ratings uh, 
I mean, Dr. Green did his rating in 1991 which was 8 
years later that essentially agreed with what had been 
paid back in 1985 but, I, I, whatever you want, that's 
fine. 
THE COURT: I'd like to ask you to do that. 
MR. DYER: Sure. 
THE COURT: And then, as far as the hearing 
is concerned, as soon, unless there is, is there 
anything else you want me to consider or to know about 
(inaudible). 
MR. GRINT: Urn, I think that pretty much 
covers it, you know, other than, you know, the 
impairment rating now is very significant. And it's, 
really affects everything that I do. Urn, you know, 
alls I can tell you is just, what I've been told 
through my conversations with the industrial commission 
so, and I haven't actually gotten anything in copy from 
them. So, 
THE COURT: Mr. Dyer, is there anything else 




























you want me to consider on the recorc? 
MR. DYER: No, I think that that's a31. 
THE COURT: Closing the medical, I'm closing 
the record on the case this, the subject (inaudible). 
Please. 
MR. DYER: Sure. 
THE COURT: Uh, with that, I. 
MR. DYER: It may take uh, couple of days. 
THE COURT: You're all right. (Inaudible). 
MR. DYER: Uh, would you like a copy? 
MR. GRINT: Of the medical records? From? 
MR. DYER: Uh, the copy of this, uh, you 
may, all right. This is only the University of Utah's 
though. 
THE COURT: You're entitled to (inaudible). 
(Many voices at the same time). 
MR. GRINT: Yea, might as well, yea. I 
would. 
know. 
MR. DYER: I could make you one, I, you 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) you know. That's 
just disorganized and. 
MR. DYER: Not a problem. 
THE COURT: Such, it maybe that it has 
contains something significant that will affect my 




























judgment. Uh, it may not. (InaudilbeO dscide afcer I 
have a look at it but Mr. Grint, you'll at least be 
able to see what is supplied and_ 
MR. GRINT: Umhm. 
THE COURT: customary (inaudible) you would 
have a copy of what (inaudible) labor commission. 
MR. GRINT: Sure. 
THE COURT: Urn, Mr. Dyer are you interested 
in submitting any kind of written summation of the law 
from your position? 
MR. DYER: Uh, you know, if there's any 
doubt, uh, I mean, I have a copy of the statute, I've, 
I'd probably refer to the statute uh, I probably refer 
to the statute and say, here's what it says and I think 
it's pretty clear. Urn, if, it's kind of an old 
statute. I assume that the commission has copies of 
those older statutes and you can take a look at them, 
but, I, I brought a copy in case you want to look at 
it. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) review (inaudible). 
MR. DYER: So you probably have everything 
that I would otherwise bring to your attention. I 
don't know what else I could do other than to show you 
what the statute says. 
THE COURT: Ok. Well I think I can handle 





























that too. (Inaudible) this case. What does your 
future look like Mr. Grint where dp you perceive your 
current condition and how it's going to ba developing 
over time? 
MR. GRINT: Well like he, li'ker hd < told you, 
I just graduated from the University of Utah urn, the 
state, voc rehab actually paid for all of my schooling, 
tuition, books and all that. So, I have been, because 
of this injury, I was in the construction business for 
quite a number of years and am no longer able to do any 
of that type of work. 
THE COURT: Are you talking about manual 
labor? - • . - " ; ' . -. 
MR. GRINT: 0: • - — 
THE COURT: Cau;ve Zbere are a ?.ot of areas 
in construction tha~ 
(inaudible) probably suxLui)Iu. -'*..-« ' T ' 
MR. GRINT: Well, any that involves 
lifting anything over 5 or 10 pounds, and I'm riuht 
handed and where I've lost the use of my right hana now 
makes that very, very difficult. I am not a left-
handed person. As much as I tried over the years, just 
becoming a lefty is tough. So, depending on what 
happens with, I got to have another surgery here I knov/ 
fairly quickly where they're going to go in and try to 
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move that nerve and get rid. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) moving what nervs 
sir? 
MR. GRINT: Well, right where the nerve ends 
in my elbow, there is an aroma that's formed which is 
like a little round ballish whatever, it's very hyper 
sensitive. Alls, alls it takes is just a little teeny 
little brush and it, kinda like, you ever been hit m 
the funny bone? That's what my arm feels like all the 
time. Right there. And hopefully that will eliminate 
that. And make it so that it's, at least I won't be on 
all the narcotics and the pain medications that I'm on 
all the time now because I am on percocets and other 
things just to control the pain right now. So 
hopefully that will cut those down. 
THE COURT: Has that been, Mr Dyer, are you 
aware of the (inaudible) on that procedure (inaudilbeO? 
MR. DYER: Yea, I think it's, correct me if 
I'm wrong, I think it's an alter nerve transposition 
that they want to do which is just to put the nerve m 
an area where it's not as exposed to outside bumps. 
MR. GRINT: Yep. 
MR. DYER: Urn, that happens, urn, with some 
regularity urn, with you know, cubital tunnel, uh, with 
(inaudible) problems with the nerve coming down through 





























the elbow given the number of surgeries that he's had 
and I haven't looked at each one, I ^m kir«da surprised 
that they haven't done that one already. But, if, if 
he needs another one, you know, 
MR. GRINT: Then on top of tne injections 
that I have, you know its. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) something 
(inaudible). Mr. Grint, are you (inaudible) where you 
have, your contact with the insurance adjuster for pre-
authorization or what's the relationship between.. 
MR. GRINT: Yes. Insurance company. There 
is an insurance company called Corvelle which the 
insurance company has sent, that goes along with me to 
doctor appointments, things like that, that is kind of 
a managed care type thing. They send a nurse all the 
time to the appointments. 
MR. DYER: Nurse case manager? 
MR. GRINT: Right, and, they basically pre-
authorize everything. So everything that's done has to 
go through them, it goes to the insurance company. 
They authorized whether or not it can be done. 
1 THE COURT: So 
you're contemplating, has 
MR. GRINT: Not 
far along in the chain it 
this new procedure that 
it been approved? 
yet, no. I don't know how 
is actually. I know that j 





























Corvelle was aware of it. How far beyond it I don't 
know. 
THE COURT: Ok. 
MR. GRINT: So. Beyond thati, you know, 
depending on how these injections continue to go, and 
the timing on those, the next thing to do is find a job 
because I haven't worked since this elbow was put in. 
THE COURT: When was that? 
MR. GRINT: That was in what, April of 2002. 
THE COURT: Well, during that time period, 
did you have (inaudible)? 
MR. GRINT: Yes. Well, like I said, the 
vocational rehab paid for all of that, you know, they 
found that my disability was severe enough that 
retraining would be necessary for me to become 
gainfully employed in another occupation. 
THE COURT: Ok, I've got some technical 
questions. I mean, kind of be very specific in 
narrowing down what I'd like to know about your 
condition. 
MR. GRINT: Ok. 
THE COURT: When you were injured in 1983, 
uh, how soon after your injury did you start receiving 
medical care? 
MR. GRINT: Oh, within about an hour. 





























THE COURT: And uh, the extent of your 
injury at the time of the injury was complete loss,, 
were you able to move your arm or your hand or anything 
at that time? 
MR. GRINT: At the time of the injury, I had 
a broken elbow, what I did was I fell off the back of 
truck, just so that you know it was a, a flat bed, like 
a pick up truck with flat bed on it that had a load of 
lumber. 
THE COURT: Umhm. 
MR. GRINT: And we were tying down a load of 
lumber on the back and I was pulling on a rope trying 
to tie a load down and the rope broke and out of reflex 
I went off the back off the back and out of reflex I 
reached back to catch myself and dropped about, I'm 
guessing about that high up to the pavement and stiff 
armed to the ground. And just pushed everything up and 
it tore all of the ligaments in my wrist and broke my 
elbow so I went from there right to the emergency room. 
THE COURT: Ok, so, after that point, uh, 
did you regain any use of your arm or is it then 
continuously the same loss as the injury? 
MR. GRINT: It's been continuously the same 
loss ever since. I don't think that there has been a 





























time period of more than 6 months that I haven't oeen 
in the doctor since. 
THE COURT: Ok. 
MR. GRINT: And that was kind of why I 
brought this particular medical record with me just 
because it shows ongoing and his medical records will 
also show the same thing that every couple of months, 
it is ongoing into the doctor's office continuously up 
through current. 
THE COURT: Do you know why if, if what you 
just said is true, that it's been the same loss as 
motion, same loss of use, same loss of everything since 
your initial injury, that you're impairment rating was 
changed? 
MR. GRINT: Well, ok, let me, let me 
rephrase that. What do you mean by the same loss of? 
THE COURT: Well, what do you mean by it, 
because I asked you a direct question. I asked you. 
MR. GRINT: Ok, originally, I had a loss of 
motion. My hand worked fine. There was nothing wrong 
with my hand originally. Ok, not for, not until 2002, 
when I had the artificial elbow put in did I lose the 
use of my hand. 
THE COURT: Ok, hang on just a second. That 
was the other (inaudible)? 
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MR. GRINT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Ok, go ahead. 
MR. GRINT: So I think I might have 
misunderstood what you meant by that. Ok, so, after 
the original injury I'd lost motion and a^ time 
progressed, I continually lost more motion. It became 
worse and worse as time went on. And it continually 
got worse. So, it wasn't the same as it is now from 
the very beginning no. I think I just misunderstood 
what you were reading. 
THE COURT: Ok. 
MR. GRINT: As far as actual problems, you 
know, I've had problems continually since then. 
THE COURT: Ok. 
MR. GRINT: Since then. 
THE COURT: I've read about your condition 
so. 
MR. GRINT: So the condition since the very 
beginning has continuously gotten worse and worse and 
worse 
elbow 
and worse and 
in, when they 
the feeling in my ha 
surgeries because or 
things , my condition 
ongoing just treatin 
worse until they 
did that, that's 
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1 I keep the pain down now since then. 
2 I THE COURT: Did you pursue any claim against 
3 the doctor of the surgery? You said one of them cold 
4 you that they had messed it up but I was just< curious. 
5 MR. GRINT: The problem that nappeiied with 
6 the surgery was that the doctor accidentally stitched 
7 around the older nerve when they were sewing things 
8 back up. And when he did it, he happened to kill a 
9 piece about that long and actually caused it to die. 
10 Now, when he did it, I immediately lost feeling to my 
11 hand. I mean, right during surgery, when you come out 
12 of the recovery room, and that, I never got the 
13 feeling back in my hand and I knew it, I knew that 
14 there was a problem and I told them there was a problem 
15 and I said that there's something wrong there. I've, 
16 other surgeries, that other nerve has gotten tied up in 
17 scar tissue and actually gotten pinched and I had 
18 problems with feeling to where the feeling would start 
19 to decrease and my hand would start to shrivel up, you 
20 know, your older (?) nerve is being pinched. We got to 
21 go in and move and then I had to have a surgery where 
22 I they'd go in there and release it. And I had that 
23 exact same thing and I told them, I knew there was a 
24 problem in there and it just so happens that when the 
25 I cast came off from that surgery, I had a hematoma right_ 





























and that's what they were told and consequently, you 
know, they sent it up to another doctor, tne file, and 
because of the way the notes are actually written, the 
surgical notes, they read the surgical notes and the 
doctor doesn't come right out and say weir I stitched 
the nerve and killed it, the doctor says we found 
sutchers in and about the area. That's that. 
MR. DYER: Almost seems like a Ray Simpson 
to me, you go in to have elbow surgery and you don't 
normally expect to come out with a hand that has loss 
of feeling, I don't know. 
MR. GRINT: No. 
MR. DYER: I'm not a malpractice guy, I was 
just curious if there was anything (inaudible) so. 
MR. GRINT: You know, I definitely wish I 
could. If I could find somebody that would do it, but, 
no. But i t happened. 
MR. DYER: There's probably a statute of 
limitations on that one too. 
MR. GRINT: Oh, there's a big statute on 
that one. 
MR. DYER: (inaudible). 
MR. GRINT: (Inaudible). 
MR. DYER: I think it's two years for. 
MR. GRINT: Yep it is, two years. But, you [ 





























know, that's, that's what happened there. 
THE COURT: What medications are you 
currently taking? 
MR. GRINT: I take Zongram(?),, everyday, I 
take . 
THE COURT: What's that for? 
MR. GRINT: Percocet, it's for the nerves. 
THE COURT: Nerves? 
MR. GRINT: Uhuh. I take Amitriptoline(?), 
which is also for the nerves. I take Percocet. And 
what else? That's it right now. Just those three 
right now. 
THE COURT: And you're having the injection? 
Yes. 
(Inaudible). 
Uh, the last one I had was a, 
urn, one of those that lasts for like three months so I 
had to have one done in quite a while. However, I do 
have the authorization to go in and redo it, so, as 
soon as I call them and make an appointment 
(inaudible). 
MR. DYER: Radio frequency next week. Radio 
frequency. It's pretty experimental actually. And a 
lot of companies don't approve them but, the only 

































to help so I think that they. 
THE COURT: Because they're, already started 
that kind of intervention. 
MR. GRINT: It's been going on now for what, 
a year and a half. Those are not fun. Those are 
almost as painful as the injury. 
MR. DYER: Well, the literature I've read 
says that it's supposed to actually increase the pain 
for the first 5 to 7 days and then it's supposed to 
give long, long term relief for up to 3 months, 3 to 4 
months. It's kind of a burning of the nerve. 
MR. GRINT: Yes. The initial trauma that 
causes the increase in pain but then after the initial 
trauma goes away, then the deadening of the nerve 
effect continues for 3 to 4 months. So it's a, worst 
part is getting the needle stuck through your throat. 
MR. DYER: It's a long road, process. 
THE COURT: Mr. Dyer, do you have any 
questions based on our (inaudible). 
MR. DYER: I don't. 
THE COURT: I know that this is somewhat 
informal but. 
MR. DYER: It has been and, but I think that 
it's appropriate for this case. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible). Mr. Grint, do you 
DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188 




























have any questions or anything you want to follow up. 
MR. GRINT: No, I think we've pxetity aiuch 
covered it all. So far so, I can't think of anything 
else. You know of, if the law says that they're not 
responsible for it, then that's the way it is. You 
know, pretty much. So, whatever you decide, I mean, 
I'm here because I was told that they were and my 
feeling is that this has progressed over time; they 
knew it was progressing over time and I was lead to 
believe that time wasn't an issue, you know, or I would 
have had it done now, so. 
THE COURT: I did analyze the comp agreement 
Mr. Dyer (inaudible). You might know the answer 
(inaudible) did that, is that, was that the statutory 
maximum? 
MR. DYER: Oh, heaven's no. I think, I 
think it was a statutory minimum, in other words, uh, I 
think that his average weekly wage was only 60 dollars 
a week and so, his comp rate was 55 which I think was 
the minimum, it's not two thirds, he was, he uh, uh, 
got almost the full wage. 
THE COURT: And for, I don't, I haven't got 
the (inaudible) uh, the number of weeks that was 
inclusive other than (inaudible) year and a half. 
(Inaudible). 





























MR. DYER: And we've paid more benefits than 
this over the years too. Cause he had more procedures 
done. 
MR. GRINT: Over the years, I thin': I put 
that in my answers. 
THE COURT: You did. I think it's 
(inaudible). But (inaudible) since the big (inaudible) 
but you're obviously entitled to (inaudible) at best if 
that were increased and awarded. I don't see it in 
your response. 
MR. DYER: Well in the, in the answer on 
page 2, paragraph 3, paid a total of 1490785 an 
indemnity and that included the 24 percent upper 
extremity of 24 (inaudible). At the time of your 
injury, did you have children or were you married, is 
that the idea? 
MR. GRINT: Yes. 
MR. DYER: Oh, ok. Cause the minimum was 4 5 
and it (inaudible) payments so he must have had two 
dependents at the time. 
THE COURT: How about that Mr. Grint? 
MR. GRINT: What's that? 
THE COURT: You were married with two 
children? 
MR. GRINT: Yes. 





























THE COURT: That's (inaudible). Well ok, I 
appreciate your having the hearing (inaudible) 
information to work with. 
MR. DYER: And I'll get this over to you. 
(Inaudible) exhibits. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
MR. DYER: Ok. 
THE COURT: At this point, (inaudible) 
formal mediation in this case. (Inaudible). 
MR. DYER: Well, we could certainly try, 
that's not, it's not out of what we'd like to do. I 
think my client would be more than anxious to settle 
the case. It's, it's just hard at, from 1983 to 2005, 
we paid two hundred and fifty thousand dollars to then 
say, from here forward it's gonna be half a million. 
(Inaudible) almost to the point where we tmnk gee, 
we've done almost everything. Maybe he needs another 
elbow replacement, maybe they need to do it even two or 
three times but I think the cost of that to the 
hospital is like twenty something thousand dollars. 
THE COURT: Just for the hospital though. 
MR. DYER: For the hospital. 
THE COURT: Did you know about how much it 
was, the total for the elbow replacement Mr. Grint? 
Ballpark unit? 
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MR. GRINT: just the hospital itself, the 
bill tftat X have v*as twenty seven ^kcusaria, yist the 
hospital bill, that doesn't include the doctor, the 
anesthesiologist, the medications and physical therapy 
and all that stuff that goes with it. 3o, and I am 
looking at being 4 5 years old right now, where I come 
up with my figure that he's talking about is, I look at 
a thousand dollars a week for these injections that I'm 
having done, which, I realize the insurance company 
doesn't quite have to pay that or, roughly 5 thousand 
dollars every three months for this radio frequency 
shot that has to be done. If you consider that for 
approximately another 3 0 years, for the rest of my 
life, the medications that I'm on are approximately a 
hundred and sixty dollars a month. Urn, the surgeries 
that I know that are upcoming, the artificial elbow is, 
has a life expectancy of 10 years maximum. So, you 
know, there's a possibility of two more of those plus, 
what happens when that 






is gone? You know, being in my 
GO years old, I can end up with a 
What is your degree in? 
Computer information systems. 
Bachelor's of Science? 
Yep-





























THE COURT: Are you actively looking for 
employment? 
MR. GRINT: Yes. I don't hava it on now but 
normally I wear a brace too to protect my arm. I have 
a brace that goes from about here to her3 and. 
THE COURT: I understand that you have 
arrived at what you think this case is worth and so 
(inaudible). 
MR. GRINT: Now, again, that's where I come 
up with this million and I realized you know that that 
would be a little silly. I realize that they're not 
going to pay that. You know. 
THE COURT: (inaudible) my question is, uh, 
sometimes I've had success letting the parties mediate 
at this stage provided that you're willing to do that. 
MR. GRINT: Umhm. 
THE COURT: If you are so far apart that 









like I said, 






: No, and it 
more than reasonabl 
I come 
ether. 
It would cer tainly 
cost anything. 
's fine with 
e with that. 





I come up with 
adding 
that. 1 
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Now I know for a fact that that's not whac they re 
gonna pay. And I don't expect then to. And tbat s 
coming up with the five hundred thousand chat I 
suggested to him and even that, it's probably a little 
bit out of hand. And I'm not unreasonacle so, I'm more 
than willing to any offer that they're willing to out 
there. What they need to understand is that, I know 
what's coming up. And I know what's probably going to 
be expected. I would just assume leave the file open 
rather than take a chance on not getting the care that 
I need in the future. You know, because, I'm not going 
to put myself in a situation that is going to be 
harmful to me in the future. I don't need the money 
right now like that. You know, if that were the case, 
I would have settled it a long time ago. So, I just 
assume. 
MR. DYER: That's why it kinda seemed like a 
case just leave it open and we'll pay for it as it 
comes. 
MR. GRINT: But at the same time, you know, 
if they want to make an offer and take it off the 
books, you know, that's ok, they've they got their 
administrative costs, and other things that are going 
along with it. So, you know, I've gone through and 
added up a lot of the bills that I have and I, I've 




























only got just a small percentage of the iaills and my 
figures obviously aren't going to match theirs but I'm 
at three hundred thousand. So, then I know that they 
only pay a percentage. He gets the grcss bills, I 
guess, and keeps them and we just only pay the every 
(inaudible). And there are bunches that I don't have. 
No, I did not used to get copies of the hospital bills 
and that in the very beginning so I don't have all that 
and it isn't until just the last maybe seven or eight 
years that the hospital has actually sent it, started 
sending copies to the patients. So, there's a lot of 
bills that I don't have, plus, I don't have all the 
bills from the doctors they sent me to for a second 
opinions and that type of thing. You know. So there 
are bunches that I don't have. So I know that my costs 
out of pocket, should I settle are going to be 
significantly higher than I think what they've paid. 
You know. 
THE COURT: Re direction your questions to 
you Mr. Dyer about any competing impairment 
information. (Inaudible). 
MR. DYER: I have not. Uh, ac the time that 
he had the surgery, I mean, it was twenty years post 
injury and I think that carry, this went so far beyond 
the years that we don't care, set up a IME to have him 
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evaluated and it's like, why? Uh, you kxiow, suppose it 
comes in at 44, or, 36, or some other number. Uh, 
what's the point, you know, it's like information that 
doesn't make any difference at this point so they 
didn't set up an IME meeting either and look at it. 
THE COURT: How do you feel about the 
ongoing jurisdiction (inaudible)? 
MR. DYER: I'd go on jurisdiction, 
obviously, allows us to be here, that's why we're here. 
Uh, but the limitation is pretty much a limitation that 
says, you have a certain amount of time in which to 
collect benefits for certain types of injuries. If you 
have permanent total disability, there's no apparent, 
uh, there's no limit. Uh, and that was subject of the 
Meechum case, they said no, there's no limit, but on 
other types of benefits, there are limits, medicals 
obviously, there's no limit. And that's not been 
denied. Urn, and so, you know, it's one of those, do 
you agree all the time with what the legislature does, 
you know, I have a hard time asking people certain 
things because you know, when you could talk about pre 
existing conditions, you don't know how many times in 
the past that I've had to ask ladies, you know, have 
you ever had a hysterectomy and they look at me like 
what does that have to do with anything? And I say 
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well, trust me, it goes to pre existing conditions and, 
and you know, a lot of people disagree with whether or 
not you should have (inaudible) that pay^ pre existing 
conditions and a portion of that, I've gotten to the 
point where uh, you know, I follow thia is vvhat the law 
is, I mean, if you try to understand it, and, you know 
there are so many competing interests that go into 
creating it, boy that's no fooling. Yea, no, I'm 
telling you, that's just the way it is and so since the 
law has different competing interests and, it's 
creating, I'm to the point where I don't second guess, 
I just look at it and say, well that's how it was then, 
it's morphed to something different now and uh, all I 
can do is say that on a permanent impairment, that's 
the way it was at the time. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you gentlemen 


































to you, if 
you could 
you 
check with my client 
number 
; kind o 
that the 
f a morphus 
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thing right now because obviously they've paid s. lot, 
but, you know, there's more to go. 
THE COURT: So as long as you're willing to 
participate in that in good faith, I'd encourage you to 
do that. That's, might be happier with the result that 
you get from that possibility than from me, I don't 
know. 
MR. DYER: Yep. 
THE COURT: But as least if you're open, urn, 
to the concept, I'll leave it to you. 
MR. GRINT: Well, I'm open to it. 
THE COURT: I'll wait until I've got the 
medical record probably to. 
MR. DYER: Review whatever you consider. 
THE COURT: Whatever's in there, unless, urn, 
what I'd like you to do Mr. Dyer is urn, is there 
(inaudible) copies yet. 
MR. DYER: Ok. 
THE COURT: J u s t g i v e me a f e w d a y s t o 
settle on, you know, on some 
that are important then I'll, 
1 MR. DYER: Well, 
it's a legal issue more than 
was why I thought, you know, 
i hundred some odd pages and ma 
of the issues that I think 
cause I (inaudigleO that. 
it, it, well my thought, 
a medical issue. And that j 
I can make it's, GOO 
Lybe the judge will want to | 
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read all 600 pages but I think it's a legal issue. 
THE COURT: Yea, I understand. 
MR. DYER: With medical undercones and, and. 
we've never really denied medical, and if we get this 
two hundred dollar bill, then ok. 
MR. GRINT: I think the biggest thing that 
the medical record is going to show is just that there 
was ongoing treatment on an consistent basis, every 
month, month after month after month, month after 
month, year after year with no break, you know. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible), give me a few days 
to just sort of work that out. And I'll contact your 
office. 
MR. DYER: Ok, sure. If you head back early 
(inaudible) just send it to me. 
MR. GRINT: I will show you what I have. 
As soon as we get done here because I don't have 
original, as in the very first bill, but I have 
subsequent statements, says was balance. 
MR. DYER: (Inaudible) refer back to 
whatever it was that they did. 
MR. GRINT: And then the correspondence for 
the doctor that you're a bunch of nuts, how come you 
didn't pay this? (Laughter) That type of thing. 
MR. DYER: Well, (inaudible). Case where a 
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guy had an injury and part of the medical record or, 
(inaudible) for his wife hysterectomy. 
MR. GRINT: Oh good. 
MR. DYER: (Inaudible) you know, ^e don't 
take bets (inaudible). 
MR. GRINT: I know. 
MR. DYER: S o , t h e y j u s t n e e d e d ( i n a u d i b l e ) . 
THE COURT: Ok, t h a n k y o u , w e ' l l b e o f f t h e 
r e c o r d . 
DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188 
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I TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
I r : ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
j I, Chris Alder, do hereby certify: 
I That I am a Certified Court Transcriber of 
Tape Recorded Court Proceedings/ that I received 
electronically recorded tapes of the within matter and 
have transcribed the same into typewriting, and the 
foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 64, inclusive, to 
the best of my ability constitute a full, true and 
correct transcription, except where it is indicated the 
Tape Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible. 
j I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
I attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of 
either party, or otherwise interested in the event of 
this suit. 
j Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 9th day 
of June, 2 0 05. 
cjL^ilh^ 
j C h r i s A l d e r | 
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MICHAEL E. DYER, [A3786] 
SHARON J. EBLEN, [5832] 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Attorneys for Respondents 
257 East 200 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT84111 
Telephone: (801)521-7900 
THE LABOR COMMISSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
Richard D. Grint, REPLY MEMORANDUM 
Petitioner, 
vs. Case No. 2004-0182 
Trimco Molding and/or Argonaut 
Insurance Company, Judge Dale W. Sessions 
Respondents. 
Respondents, Trimco Molding and/or Argonaut Insurance Company, by and 
through their attorney(s), Michael E. Dyer and Sharon J. Eblen, of Blackburn & Stoll. 
LC, file this REPLY MEMORANDUM in the above referenced matter. 
1. The Petitioner was injured by accident in the course and scope of his 
employment with Respondents on July 23, 1983. Accordingly, the provisions of the 
Workers' Compensation Act in effect on that date apply to his claim. The Petitioner's 
Application for Hearing seeks payment of additional temporary total disability (TTD) and 
permanent partial disability (PPD) compensation. Respondents' Answer to the 
Application for Hearing raises the eight year statutes of limitations under Utah Code 
§35-1-99, as well as the eight year maximum periods to receive temporary total 
disability (TTD) and permanent partial disability (PPD) compensation contained in Utah 
Code §§35-1-65 (1981 Amendment) and 35-1-66 (1983 Amendment). 
2. The Petitioner asserts that the Utah Supreme Court's analysis in Vigos v. 
Mountain Land Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, applies in this matter. Respondents assert 
that while that case may apply to the application of Utah Code §35-1-99, the Vigos 
decision does not address or apply to the 8 year limitation provisions of Utah Code 
§§35-1-65 and 35-1-66. The plain language of those statutory provisions bars claims 
for additional benefits that occur more than eight years after the date of the Industrial 
Accident. 
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3. Utah Code §35-1-65 (1) ((1981 Amendment) provided in relevant part: 
"In no case shall such compensation benefits exceed 312 
weeks at the rate of 100% of the State's average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury over a period o* eight years 
from the date of the injury." Exhibit A. Utah Code §35-1-66 
(1983 Amendment) provided: "The Commission may make 
a permanent partial disability award at any time prior to eight 
years after the date of injury to an employee whose physical 
condition resulting from such injury is not finally healed and 
fixed eight years after the date of injury and who files an 
application for such purpose prior to the expiration of such 
eight year period." Exhibit B. 
4. Accordingly, the Respondents in this matter assert that the plain language 
of the statute bars the Petitioner's claim for additional temporary total disability (TTD) 
and permanent partial disability (PPD) compensation pursuant to the Application for 
Hearing that was filed by him on March 5, 2004, almost 21 years after the date of his 
accident. Respondents request that the Commissioner reverse the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order issued by Judge Sessions because the Order does not 
comply with the clear language of the statute in effect on the date of the Petitioner's 
July 23, 1983 industrial accident. 
Dated this day of July, 2005. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Sharon J. Eblen 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of REPLY MEMORANDUM was mailed, 
first class, postage prepaid on the &t&*^~ day of July, 2005 to: 
Richard R. Burke 
King, Burke & Schaap 
648 East 100 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Argonaut Insurance Company 
Attn: Brian Heaton 
7272 East Indian School Road, Suite 209 
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251 




insured workers determined by dividing the total insured workers reported for the preceding 
year by twelve The average annual wage thus obtained shaU be divided by 52, and the average 
weekly wage thus determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state a\erage weekly wage 
as so determined shall be used as the basis for computing the maximum compensation rate for 
injuries or disabilities arising from occupational disease which occurred during the twelve-
month period commencing July 1 following the June 1 determination, and any death resulting 
therefrom 
[Effective May 13, 1975-May 9, 1977.] 
* 1977 Amendment* 
35-1-65. Temporary disability — Amount of payments — State average weekly wage defined. 
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee shall receive 66%% of that employee's average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such disability is total, but not more than a 
maximum of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not 
less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent 
minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor 
children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but 
not to exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. In no 
case shall such compensation benefits exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury over a period of eight years from the date of the 
injury. 
(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to in Chapters 1 and 2 of this title shall be 
determined by the commission as follows: on or before June 1 of each year, the total wages 
reported on contribution reports to the department of employment security under the 
commission for the preceding calendar year shall be divided by the average monthly number of 
insured workers determined by dividing the total insured workers reported for the preceding 
year by twelve The average annual wage thus obtained shall be divided by 52, and the average 
weekly wage thus determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state average weekly wage 
as so determined shall be used as the basis for computing the maximum compensation rate for 
injuries or disabilities arising from occupational disease which occurred during the twelve-
month period commencing July 1 following the June 1 determination, and any death resulting 
therefrom. 
[Effective May 10, 1977-May 11, 1981.] 
*1981 Amendment* 
35-1-65. Temporary disability — Amount of payments — State average weekly wage defined. 
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee shall receive 66%% of that employee's average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such disability is total, but not more than a 
maximum of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not 
less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent 
child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent children, not to 
exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 
100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. In no case shall such 
compensation benefits exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage 
at the time of the injury over a period of eight years from the date of the injury. 
In the event a light duty medical release is obtained prior to the employee reaching a 
fixed state of recovery, and when no such light duty employment is available to the employee 
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from the employer, temporary disability benefits shall continue to be paid. 
(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to \u Chapteis 1 and 7 of this title shall be 
determined by the commission as follows: on or beibre June 1 of each year, the total wages 
reported on contribution reports to the department of employment security under the 
commission for the preceding calendar year shall be divided by the average monthly number of 
insured workers determined by dividing the total insured workers reported for the preceding 
year by twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall be divided by 52, and the average 
weekly wage thus determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state average weekly wage 
as so determined shall be used as the basis for computing the maximum compensation rate for 
injuries or disabilities arising from occupational disease which occurred during the twelve-
month period commencing July 1 following the June 1 determination, and any death resulting 
therefrom. 
[Effective May 12, 1981-present.] 
35-1-65.1. Temporary partial disability — Amount of payments. 
Where the injury causes temporary partial disability for work, the employee shall receive, during 
such disability for not to exceed 312 weeks over a period of not to exceed eight years from the date 
of the injury, compensation equal to 66%% of the difference between that employee's average weekly 
wages before the accident and the weekly wages that employee is able to earn thereafter, but not 
more than a maximum of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of injury per week and 
in addition thereto $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 
years, up to a maximum of four such dependent children, but not to exceed 100% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of injury per week. 
The commission may make an award for temporary partial disability for work at any time prior 
to eight years after the date of the injury to an employee whose physical condition resulting from such 
injury is not finally healed and fixed eight years after the date of injury and who files an application 
for such purpose prior to the expiration of such eight-year period. 
In no case shall the weekly payments continue after the disability ends or the death of the injured 
employee. 
[Effective May 12, 1981-June30, 1988] 
*1988 Amendment* 
35-1-65.1. Temporary partial disability — Amount of payments. 
(1) If the injury causes temporary partial disability for work, the employee shall receive weekly 
compensation equal to: 
(a) 66%% of the difference between the employee's average weekly wages before the 
accident and the weekly wages the employee is able to earn after the accident, but not 
more than 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of injury; plus 
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a maximum of four such dependent children, but only up to a total weekly 
compensation that does not exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of injury. 
(2) The commission may make an award for temporary partial disability for work at any time prior 
to eight years after the date of the injury to an employee: 
(a) whose physical condition resulting from the injury is not finally healed and fixed eight 
years after the date of injury; and 
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*1983 Amendment* 
35-1-66, Permanent partial disability — Scale of payments. 
The commission may make a permanent partial disaoiFty award ai any time prior to eight years 
after the date of injury to an employee whose physical condition resulting from such injury is not 
finally healed and fixed eight years after the date of injury and who files an application for such 
purpose prior to the expiration of such eight-year period. 
In no case shall the weekly payments continue after the disability ends, or the death of the 
injured person. 
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 66%% of that employee's 
average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 66%% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week 
plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent children, but not to exceed 66%% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week, to be paid weekly for the number of weeks stated against 
such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition to the compensation provided for temporary total 
disability and temporary partial disability, to wit: 
For the loss of: Number of Weeks 
(A) Upper extremity 
(1) Arm 
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter amputation) 218 
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above deltoid insertion 187 
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and elbow joint, at elbow joint, 
or below elbow joint proximal to insertion of biceps tendon 178 
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal to insertion of biceps tendon 168 
(2) Hand 
(a) At wrist or midcarpal or midmetacarpal amputation 168 
(b) All fingers except thumb at metacarpophalangeal joints 101 
(3) Thumb 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of carpometacarpal bone 67 
(b) At interphalangeal joint 50 
(4) Index finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone 42 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 34 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 18 
(5) Middle finger 
(a) At metacajpophaJangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone 34 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 27 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 15 
(6) Ring finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone 17 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 13 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 8 
(7) Little finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone 8 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 6 
98 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 4 
(B) Lower extremity 
(1) Leg 
(a) Hemipelvectomy (leg, hip and pelvis) 156 
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less below tuberosity of ischium 125 
(c) Leg above knee with functional stump, at kne^ joint o** Gritti-Stokes 
amputation or below knee with short stump (three inches or less 
below intercondylar notch) 112 
(d) Leg below knee with functional stump 88 
(2) Foot 
(a) Foot at ankle 88 
(b) Foot partial amputation (Chopart's) 66 
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation 44 
(3) Toes 
(a) Great toe 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone 26 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint 16 
(Hi) At interphalangeal joint 12 
(b) Lesser toe (2nd - 5th) 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone 4 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint 3 
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal joint 2 
(iv) At distal interphalangeal joint 1 
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints 26 
(4) Miscellaneous 
(a) One eye by enucleation 120 
(b) Total blindness of one eye 100 
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing 100 
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to loss of the member. Partial 
loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the complete loss or loss of use of the 
member. This paragraph, however, shall not apply to the items listed in (B) (4). 
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be determined and paid as follows: 
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in decibels with frequencies 
of 500, 1000, 2000 and 3000 cycles per second (cps) using pure tone air conduction audiometric 
instruments (ANSI 1969) approved by nationally recognized authorities in the field of measurement 
of hearing impairment. Reduction of hearing ability in frequencies above 3000 cycles per second shall 
not be considered in determining compensable disability. If the average decibel loss at 500, 1000, 
2000, and 3000 cycles per second is 25 decibels or less, usually no hearing impairment exists. 
"Presbycusis" is defined as hearing loss common to persons of advanced age and is considered 
to be due to general environment rather than industrial conditions. 
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of medical and paramedical professionals appointed 
by the commission shall measure the loss in each ear at the four frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, and 
3000 cycles per second which shall be added together and divided by four to determine the average 
decibel loss. To determine the percentage of hearing loss in each ear, the average decibel loss for 
each decibel of loss exceeding 25 decibels shall be multiplied by V/2% up to the maximum of 100% 
99 
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which is reached at 92 decibels. 
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying the percentage cf heanpg loss in the better 
ear by five, then adding the percentage of hearing loss in fhe poorer <?ar anc frviahg by six. The 
resulting figure is the percentage of binaural hearing los^. Compensation for permanent partial 
disability for binaural hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the percentage of binaural 
hearing loss by 100 weeks of compensation benefits as provided in this chapter. Where an employee 
files one or more claims for hearing loss the percentage of hearing5 loss previously found to exist shall 
be deducted from any subsequent award by the commission. In no event snail compensation benefits 
be paid for total or 100% binaural hearing loss exceeding 100 weeks of compensation benefits. 
For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily function not otherwise provided for herein, 
such period of compensation as the commission shall deem equitable and in proportion as near as may 
be to compensation for specific loss as set forth in the schedule in this section but not exceeding in 
any case 312 weeks, which shall be considered the period of compensation for permanent total loss 
of bodily function. 
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations as to the maximum weekly 
amount payable as specified in this section, and in no event shall more than a maximum of 66%% of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be 
required to be paid. 
[Effective May 10, 1983-June30, 1988.] 
* 1988 Amendment* 
35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of payments. 
An employee who sustained a permanent impairment as a result of an industrial accident and 
who files an application for hearing under Section 35-1-99 may receive a permanent partial disability 
award from the commission. 
Weekly payments may not in any case continue after the disability ends, or the death of the 
injured person. 
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 66%% of that employee's 
average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 66%% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week 
plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent children, but not to exceed 66%% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week, to be paid weekly for the number of weeks stated against 
such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition to the compenseition provided for temporary total 
disability and temporary partial disability, to wit: 
For the loss of: Number of Weeks 
(A) Upper extremity 
(1) Arm 
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter amputation) 218 
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above deltoid insertion 187 
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and elbow joint, at elbow joint, 
or below elbow joint proximal to insertion of biceps tendon 178 
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal to insertion of biceps tendon 168 
(2) Hand 
(a) At wrist or midcarpal or midmetacarpal amputation 168 
(b) All fingers except thumb at metacarpophalangeal joints 101 
100 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
RICHARD D. GRINT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
TRIMCO MOULDING and 
ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Respondents. 
ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case No. 04-0182 
Trimco Moulding and its insurance carrier, Argonaut Insurance Company (referred to jointly 
as "Trimco" hereafter), ask the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge 
Sessions' award of benefits to Richard D Grint under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the 
Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-12 and Utah Code Ann §34A-2-801(3) 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Mr. Grint injured his right elbow while working for Trimco on July 22, 1983. Trimco 
accepted liability for the injury under Utah's workers' compensation system and paid Mr. Grint's 
medical expenses, as well as temporary total and permanent partial disability compensation. 
In an application filed on March 1, 2004, and amended on March 25, 2004, Mr. Grint sought 
additional medical and disability benefits for the injuries he had suffered in the 1983 accident. Judge 
Sessions held an evidentiary hearing on February 16, 2005, at which time Mr. Grint explicitly 
narrowed his claim to additional permanent partial disability compensation and medical expenses 
On March 23, 2005, Judge Sessions issued his decision Despite the limited scope of issues 
Mr. Grint had identified at the evidentiary hearing, Judge Sessions 1) retroactively increased the rate 
of Mr. Grint's temporary total and permanent partial disability compensation, 2) awarded temporary 
total disability compensation at the increased rate from July 23, 1983, for 312 weeks, 3) awarded 
additional permanent partial disability compensation at the increased rate for Mr Grint's current 
impairment rating, 4) awarded interest on all unpaid disability compensation, and 5) ordered Trimco 
to pay Mr Grint's medical expenses. 
Trimco now asks the Commission to review Judge Sessions' decision Specifically, Trimco 
asserts that Judge Sessions erred by addressing issues not raised by Mr Grint and by awarding 
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additional permanent partial disability compensation l Trimco also argues Mr. Grint's claim should be 
remanded to Judge Sessions to determine whether liability for Mr. Grint's benefits should be 
apportioned between Trimco and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
DISCUSSION 
Adjudication of issues not raised by Mr Grint. In Hilton Hotel v. Industrial Commission, 897 
P.2d 352, 356 (Utah App. 1995), and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 847 P.2d 418, 
420 (Utah App. 1993), the Utah Court of Appeals struck down administrative agency decisions that 
purported to adjudicate issues that had not been raised in the adjudicatory proceedings before those 
agencies. The Court of Appeals based its decisions in Hilton Hotel and Chevron on the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Combe v. Warren Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984). 
There the Utah Supreme Court stated the following principle: "It is error to adjudicate issues not 
raised before or during trial and unsupported by the record. The trial court is not privileged to 
determine matters outside the issues of the case, and if he does, his findings will have no force or 
effect." 
The Commission has carefully reviewed the entire record in this matter and notes that only 
two issues were submitted to Judge Sessions for decision: Mr. Grint's right to medical benefits and 
his right to additional permanent partial disability compensation for an increased impairment rating. 
Judge Sessions did not inform the parties that he intended to adjudicate any other issues. 
Consequently, the evidence and argument presented during the hearing focused entirely on the two 
issues raised by Mr. Grint. But the decision issued by Judge Sessions went beyond those two issues 
to increase the rate of disability compensation, both retroactively and prospectively, and to award 
additional temporary total disability compensation In light of the decisions of the Utah Court of 
Appeals and Utah Supreme Court cited above, the Commission concludes it was error for Judge 
Sessions to raise and decide these additional issues.2 The Commission will therefore set aside Judge 
Sessions' decision on those issues. 
Additional permanent partial disability compensation. While it was improper for Judge 
Sessions to decide issues sua sponte, Mr. Grint did raise two issues that were actually litigated and, 
therefore, properly decided by Judge Sessions The first of those issues, Mr. Grint's right to payment 
of medical expenses, has been conceded by Trimco and need not be considered further. The second 
1 Because the Commission finds these issues dispositive, it does not identify or address Trimco's 
other arguments 
2 The record in this matter illustrates the necessity of limiting decisions to those issues actually raised 
during the hearing process Because no one identified compensation rate or duration of temporary 
total disability as disputed issues, no evidence or argument was presented on those issues. 
Consequently, when Judge Sessions addressed those issues sua sponte, he relied on incomplete 
evidence and reached conclusions that may be significantly inaccurate. 
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issue, Mr. Grint's right to an award of additional permanent partial disability compensation remains in 
dispute. 
The unfortunate circumstances regarding Mr. Grint's claim for additional permanent partial 
disability compensation are as follows. On July 22, 1983, when Mr. Grint was a young man, he 
injured his elbow while working for Trimco. Thereafter, for the next 20 or more years, he required 
repeated surgeries on his injured elbow By 1985 he was rated as having a 14% whole person 
impairment from the injury. Trimco paid him permanent partial disability compensation accordingly. 
Thereafter, Mr. Grint continued to require periodic surgeries on the elbow. By November 2003, 
more than 20 years after the original work accident, Mr. Grint was rated with a 44% whole person 
impairment. I 
The question before the Commission is whether, this many years after Mr. Grint's accident, 
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act allows the Commission to award additional permanent partial 
disability compensation for Mr Grint's increased impairment rating. In considering this question, the 
Commission recognizes that the Utah Workers' Compensation Act must be liberally construed in 
favor of coverage and compensation. Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co. 956 P.2d 257 at 260 (Utah 
1998); Burgess v. Siaperas Sand & Gravel 965 P.2d 583, 588 (Utah App. 1998). However, the 
Commission must also apply the provisions of the Act according to their plain language. 
At the time of Mr. Grint's accident in 1983, an injured worker's right to permanent partial 
disability compensation was governed by the following Version of Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-66:3 
The commission may make a permanent partial disability award at any time prior to 
eight years after the date of injury to an employee whose physical condition resulting 
from such injury is not finally healed and fixed eight years after the date of injury and 
who files an application for such purpose prior to the expiration of such eight-year 
period. 
Despite this statutory limitation against awards of permanent partial disability compensation more 
than eight years after the date of injury, Judge Sessions has awarded such compensation to Mr. Grint 
nearly 22 years after the date of injury. 
Mr. Grint attempts to support Judge Sessions' award by reference to the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Vigos v. MountainlandBuilders, Inc., 993 P. 2d 207 (Utah 2000). However, 
Vigos only addressed the statutory requirement that a timely application be filed and did not consider 
§ 66's eight-year limitation for entry of an award Mr Grint also cites the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Stoker v. Workers Compensation Fund, 889 P.2d 409 (Utah 1994). But Stoker 
3 In 1997, the Utah Workers' Compensation Act was recodified as Title 34A, Chapter 2. The 
Act's provisions for permanent partial disability compensation are now found at § 34A-2-412. 
These provisions also have been substantively amended since 1983 
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considered statutory provisions for temporary total disability compensation, rather than the permanent 
partial disability compensation Furthermore, Mr Grint relies on dicta in the Stoker decision that 
conflicts with the actual holding of the case 
Finally, Mr Grint cites § 34A-2-417(2)(c) of the Act, which allows the Commission to award 
compensation "a reasonable time period beyond 12 years from the date of accident " However, the 
authority granted by § 417(2)(c) is specifically restricted by several conditions One of those 
conditions is that within 12 years after the accident, a) a Commission-approved rehabilitation plan is 
in place, but the results of such a plan are either not yet known, or b) litigation is ongoing at the 
Commission Mr Grint's claim does not satisfy these preconditions Consequently, even if it is 
assumed that § 417(2)(c) can be applied retroactively to Mr Grint's claim, the claim does not fall 
within the parameters of § 417(2)(c) 
In light of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that it cannot now award additional 
permanent partial disability for Mr Grint's 1983 injury and that Judge Sessions erred in awarding 
such additional compensation 
As a final matter, the Commission declines to consider Trimco's argument for apportionment 
of liability for Mr Grint's benefits between Trimco and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund In light of 
the Commission's decision setting aside Judge Sessions' award of additional compensation, the issue 
of apportionment is largely moot Furthermore, Trimco failed to either raise the issue or present 
supporting evidence at the appropriate time in these proceedings 
ORDER 
The Commission grants Trimco's motion for review and sets aside Judge Sessions' decision 
and order, except for paragraph 26, page 4, of the order, which requires Trimco to pay Mr Grint's 
reasonable expenses for necessary medical treatment of his work-related elbow injury It is so 
ordered 
Dated this / / day of January, 2006 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
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5580 Capri Dr 
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Argonaut Insurance Company 
101 California St Ste 1150 
San Francisco ID 94111 
Richard Burke Esq 
648 E 100 S Ste 200 
Salt Lake City UT 84102 
Michael Dyer Esq 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Sara Danielson 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
RICHARD D. GRINT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
TRIMCO MOULDING and 
ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Respondents. 
ORDER DENYING REQUEST 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Case No. 04-0182 
Richard D. Grint asks the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider its prior decision regarding 
Mr. Grint's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, 
Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §63-46b-13. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
On January 17, 2006, the Labor Commission reversed Judge Sessions' award of additional 
disability compensation to Mr. Grint for injuries he suffered while working for Trimco on July 22, 
1983. Specifically, the Commission concluded that Judge Sessions had erred in raising and deciding 
sua sponte the issues of Mr. Grint's 1) compensation rate and 2) right to additional temporary total 
disability compensation. The Commission also concluded Judge Sessions had erred in awarding 
additional permanent partial disability compensation to Mr. Grint. 
In requesting reconsideration, Mr. Grint argues the two issues identified above were properly 
presented to Judge Sessions for decision. On that basis, Mr. Grint further argues that the 
Commission should evaluate the merits of those issues, taking into consideration certain 
documentary evidence that Mr. Grint submitted after the evidentiary hearing. 
DISCUSSION 
The essential fact missing from Mr. Grint's argument is that, at the beginning of the 
evidentiary hearing on his claim, Mr. Grint affirmatively stated to Judge Sessions and Trimco that 
the claim was limited to permanent partial disability compensation for an increased impairment 
rating. Consequently, neither party submitted evidence or argument on any other issues, nor did 
Judge Sessions inquire into any other issues. 
m% 
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In light of the limits Mr. Grint placed on his claim, Trimco was not required to produce 
evidence on any other issues. Judge Sessions erred, not by failing to pursue other issues during the 
evidentiary hearing, but in later deciding additional issues that Mr. Grint had excluded from 
consideration. And because such additional issues were waived by Mr. Grint, the Commission will 
not consider post-hearing evidence on those issues. 
As a final point, Mr. Grint suggests that he should be allowed to reopen his claim because he 
was not represented by counsel at the evidentiary hearing. However, it appears Mr. Grint chose to 
represent himself at the evidentiary hearing. By all accounts, he is very capable and has substantial 
past experience with the workers' compensation system. Under these circumstances, the 
Commission does not consider Mr. Grint's representation of himself as a basis to reopen this 
proceeding. 
ORDER 
The Commission reaffirms its previous decision in this matter and denies Mr. Grint's request 
for reconsideration. It is so ordered. 
Dated this Xo day of February, 2006. 
R. Lee Ellertson 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For 
Review with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Reconsideration in the 
matter of Richard D Grint, Case No. 20040182, was mailed, first class, postage prepaid this ^ ^ d a y 
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Richard D Grint 
5580 Capri Dr 
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Michael E. Dyer 
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Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
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